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INTRODUCTION 
PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE 
• 
Is language merely one subject of philosophical specu-
lation? Or is it the subj ect of philosophy? The Tradi tionalist 
complains: "The queen of the sciences has been unjustly de-
throned in our times. No longer does she make pronouncements on 
retlity. She is merely a handmaid to human language. Once she 
dwelt in th e courts of Being, Soul, Nature, God. Now she is 
retained in the banter of the antechamber, uncertain of the 
court b~ond. This is the modern involvement in mere language." 
Then the Traditionalist is confronted with tradition. 
Philosophic thought at its origins was concerned with language. 
The search fo r wi sdom has al tlays been &. fiearch fo r th e Word. 
Heraclitus heard the Logos break primordial silence. The 
Hebrews opened their ears and hearts to the Word of God. The 
Hindus listened to ~, the sacred Word of words. The ancients 
realized that the discovery of the meaning of anything, of real-
ity itself, was the pronouncement of its logos. Philosophy has 
always been the attempt to speak t~le ultimate Word wi th the 
original Word. When Socrates was pee. 'ing into the essence of 
~ dikaion, ~~, episteme, ~ agathon, he was indulging him-
self in lin~istic analysis. His dialectical method consisted 
1 
in determining how the word "dikaion" was being used by his 
contemporari es. When his oonversationalist friends and drinking 
companions offered their definitions of the word, he would 
counter by offering a ~ that did not admit their definitions. 
Is Aristotle's pursuit of the laws of thought in the 
Organon significantly different from Russell's pursuit of the 
perfect language? 
Bri ti sh analysis. 
And Russell is the founder of contemporary 
Both were beginning with the language they 
spoke; both were attempting to find the invariable structure of 
that language. And so the name "logic" was gi ven to their work. 
Certainly the ancients implicitly re~ognized language to be the 
basic act of man when they defined him ~ logicon. The words 
mean not only "rational animal" but also "speaking animal" or 
"symbolic anima1"--a definition recently resurrected by Ernst 
Cassirer, the philosopher of symbolic forms. 
Passing from the anci ents to th e medieva1s, one finds 
language analysis once again. Scholasticism emerges from the 
stream of logic. From a concern with the use of words, vast 
metaphysical systems were developed. The questions about the 
universals, the most barbed questions of the era, were linguis-
tic problems. It is not that these problems necessary arose 
from a misuse of WJrds as the anti-metaphysicians claim today. 
But they were concerned with the use of concepts which were 
verba interiora. Moreover the medieva1s were concerned with the 
language act which was the dictio verbi or the propositio--the 
putting forth of words. Besides this, the scholastic mode of 
3 
procedure anticipated modern a~alysis in the use of distinctions, 
classifications, and structures of concepts. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers on 
the continent--perhaps Kant is the best example--began their 
systems w.ith propositions. They devided them, classified them, 
argued back to the act w:lich produced them, inquired into their 
conditions of possibility. And across the channel Berkely and 
Hume, the founders of British empiricism and the predecessors of 
British analysis, sought out the meanings of words and, like 
their analytic followers, declared many of these words meaning-
less. 
And so th e contemporary concern with language is not new. 
And yet it is quite new. For the age of Russell and Wittgen-
stein, of Cassirer and von Humboldt, of Heideggar and Merleau-
Panty is not only involved in language and concerned with 
language, it is aware of its involvement and concern. Although 
philosophy at the time of Socrates and Abelard and Hume were in 
tact carrying on a sort of language analysis, only at present 
has philosophy become conscious of that fact. This self. 
consciousness raises philosophy to a new level. She still re-
tains her concern with Being; but she attemts to re-discover it 
as it is already being attained in mants characteristic act of 
speech. The awareness of her own use of language as well as the 
development and relativity of language, has taught philosophy 
her limitations. It has taught her that there 1s a plurality of 
val id and unique symbo Ii c systems of whi ch she is only on e. 
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Each of these is an approach to reality and a development of a 
new world. And yet philosophy retains her throne. She 1s 
queen of all the sciences. For she is the symbolic act of all 
these myriad symbolic acts. She enters all these symbolic 
worlds and captures the symbolic act which fonn those worlds. 
In herself she finds the unity of symbolic act and the unity of 
the world. She 1s speaking about reality in speaking about 
speaking. She is a process of discovering and uttering the 
Logos of all the logoi. 
The contemporary interest in language takes two direc-
tions. The two directions can be discerned by contrasting the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus '..dth the Wittgenste1n of the 
Philosophical Investigations, or, in general, by contrasting 
British analysis, especially the more positivistic speCies, and 
the phenomenology of language of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
On the one hand, there is a concern with language as a finished 
s¥stem. Language is taken and examined as it is found. It is 
found already in being and separated from the process of its 
origin. Language analyzed in this way takes on an opaqueness 
and stability. One assumes that there lies a reality behind the 
words and that the structure of reality is the same as the 
structure of language (Russell). Or one admits that he cannot 
really know the reality behind words, but must totally involve 
himself wi th the use and meaning of objecti ve words (Ayer). 
The other appoach to language and the language-world ia 
through the language act as it is lived in the very process of 
5 
speech. In the act of expression one finds himself already in 
contact with the \«.)rld through symbols. These symbols are not 
"pictures" hiding reality but, as it were, "frames" which allow 
the world to appear. Primary expression is totally given to 
objects in the \«.)rld. Because of th~s a philosophy can be so 
prejudiced by objective thought that it forgets its own a£l of 
being totally gi ven to objects in the world. It becomes 
involved in the spoken forgetting the act of speaking. Only by 
rediscovering this act, which is non-objectively given to her 
all the time, will philosophy break out of the prison that 
objective thought builds fnr herself. By pointing out the 
expressing act as it is lived, by affirming it in primary exper-
ience, philosophy overcomes the antinomies of objective thought 
between consciousness and nature, action and cognition, the 
world and the self. By approaching reality through the express-
ing act itself. This analysis provides a basic structure of act 
whi.ch allows for a development and relativity of acts and worlds 
and which al'so forms a unity in man and reality. It leads to an 
ethics and metaphysics as "objective thought" cannot do. 
Here through the writings of Merleau-Panty, the second 
path of language analysis will be explored. Conceiveably the 
phenomenologLcal philosophy of Merleau-Ponty might be approached 
in many ways. The critiC might center his analysis upon Merleau-
Ponty's psychology of the body or his aesthetics, his social 
philosophy or his philosophy of science. For Marleau-Ponty 
exercises great influence in all the sciences of man as man. 
o 
But by approaching all his work through his phenomenology of 
language, the actual core of his thought is reached. For man 
as man is a bodily-expression. Society is essentially a com-
munity of speakers. The arts and sciences are man's symbolic 
approaches to the world. Not only is the core of Merleau-Ponty's 
thought reached by examining his phenomenology of language; but 
in a real sense one achieves the core of all contemporary thought 
in its concern with and utterance of the Word. 
The broad lines of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
language will be drawn in the following manner. In chapter one 
his language theory will be situated in the totality of his 
philosophy. It will be seen just why language 1s at the core of 
his thought and how it extends to all areas of his philosophy. 
Then this language theory will be treated dialectically in the 
spirit of Merleau-Ponty himself. In chapter two the language 
act will be found as revelative of human existence: To exist 
is to express to a world. Man is essentially a speaker. His 
body is originative of meaning. To understand him and what he 
speaks, one must grasp the act of expression as it is lived. 
The fUndamental problem of this chapter is the unity of man. In 
chapter three the other pole, that of the world, will come into 
focus. The fUndamental problem here concerns the multiplicity 
of acts and expressions. How is communication and a common world 
possible? Human existence could not be understood except as 
~-~-world (chapter two); the world could not be understood 
except in relation to human existence (chapter three)o Now the 
s 
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polarities are synthesized in the fourth chapter which endeavors 
to discover with Merleau-Ponty the basic structure of reality 
and the absolute. 
This author believes that this manner of presentation is 
faithful not merely to the doctrine of Merleau-Ponty, but also 
to his spirit of incompleteness, openness, and inquiry. Merleau-
Pony was not a finished philosopher, but always in proeess. To 
be faithful to him it is important that his interpreter go beyond 
"secondary expression"--the mere repetition of doctrine. He must 
authentieally ineorporate this doctrine into his own process of 
search for and utterance of the Word. 
CHAP'l'ER I 
SITUATING LANGUAGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF t-1ERLEAU-PONTY 
Before speaking of anyone area of interest in the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, one should ask what!! philosophy 
for Merleau-Ponty, What is its method, how in general does it 
proceed. Our area of special interest is language, mainly because 
of its central position in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. From the 
vantage point of language one can survey his whole thought. But 
first one must find his way through the totality to get to this 
center, as an explorer blazes his trail through unmarked lands 
to reach a hill upon which he can survey and organize the sur-
rounding territory. So the action here is two-fold: Rebuild 
the totality or context of Mer 1 eau-Ponty , s thought in its 
broadest lines to see how this thought culminates in the problem 
of language. Then from this viewpoint glance out into the 
totality. The first action is what is meant by "situating 
language in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty" and is the occupa-
tion of the present chapter. The second action will be taken up 
in subsequent chapters. 
"Our end," writes Merleau-Ponty, "is to understand the 
relations of consciousness and of nature." These words are at 
g 
the very beginning of his Structure ~ Comportementl and near the 
end of the Phenomenologie ~ 11 Perception,2 two books which 
should be read as part one and part two of one grand philosoph-
ical movement. Here Merleau-Ponty locates himself and his 
problem in h1story--in a dialectical tradition of idealism and 
realism where the explanation of reality is found in subjective 
consciousness or objective nature. His role is synthesis. For 
he wants to demonstrate that explanation somehow resides in both 
or, metaphorically, in the area between both. His philosophy, 
then, will be neither empiricism nor idealism, but an empiricism 
that takes into itself idealism, or an idealism that takes in 
empiricism. He will attempt a philosophy on a new level that 
does not deny the lower levels, but subsumes them and transforms 
them in the subsumption. 3 
But why should one be concerned about the relations of 
consciousness and nature? This pushes the Question of philosophy 
further. Why, one might ask Merleau-Ponty, why philosophize at 
lMaurice Merlea.u-Ponty J La Structure du comrortement (2d 
ed.; Paris: Presses Unlversitaires de France;-1949 , p. 1. 
Hereafter referred to as S .£. 
2Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception 
(Paris: Librarie Gallimard, 1945), p. 4a9. Hereafter referred to 
as f..f.. 
JCompare Hegel's aufgehoben. It is apparent that Merleau-
Ponty read Hegel sympathetically, especially, as he himself notes, 
the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Sririt. He writes in his 
essay on He~el in Sens .~ Hon-Sens ~aris: Nagel, 1945), p. 125: 
"Hegel est a l'orlgine de tout ce qui fait de grand en philosoph-
ie depuis un siecle." As a dialectical movement towards 
freedom, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is Hegelian in spirit. Even 
his central problem is stated in Hegelian or Marxist terms. 
all? ~~at is philosophy? 
Philosophy and Phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty 
Philosophy is essentially a search, Merleau-Ponty told 
his students in his inaugural lecture at t he College de France. 
And this search discovers its own problems and poses them in a 
new way. It does not simply accept past problems and their 
solutions. 4 The philosopher is attempting to get a hold of him-
self and of his world of things and fellow men. 5 The philosopher, 
then, is undergoing a sort of auto-psychoanalytic process. For 
it is by a radidal re£lection and consequent thematization of 
one's relations with the world, with others, and with himself 
that one finds, accepts, and masters himself in union with the 
other. 6 In other words, philosophy is the search to solve man's 
alienation from the world, from men, and from himself. It is a 
search for truth not in the abstract. The philosopher's very 
problems arise in function of the life in which he is engaged 
with his fellow-men and are worked out in that context, in 
communication. 7 Again, he searches to get a hold over himself 
in relation with his fellow man and his world. Thus the end 
of philosophy is mastery over the situation, so to speak, or 
4,Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eloge de la. Philosorhie (Paris: 
Librarie Ga11imard, 1953), p. 9. See atso-Jean Eco e, "Rentree 
au College de France avec I~. Merleau-Ponty," Revue Thomiste, 
LIII, No.1, 194. 
5f.f., ISO. 6P.f., 519. 
7Mer1eau-Ponty, Eloge ••• , 48 and 85; Ecole, 194. 
freedom. This is not an absolute, isolated freedom of conscious-
ness, pour soi, separated from the world, but an engaged freedom 
or incarnate freedom in which the philosopher is both within 
(attached to) and above (detached from) the v.;orld--"both less a 
;nan and mor e than a man. ng 
How does this search to recover one's rapport with the 
IN'orld, to negate the negation of a.lienation, unfold? The phil-
osopher's work is to "describe" the primordial data of conscious-
ness, that is, its presence to th e ivorld and the world's 
presence to it "before" this presence was ruptured by the objec-
tification and deanthropomorphism of science. One must discover 
or re-create the pre-scientific or pre-cognitive lived world. 
This activi.ty will ground man's science and lI'ill give a meaning 
to all his activities in the world. 9 
This radical reflection upon and description of the 
primordial relations of luan and world in order to find and gi ve 
,uoaning to man's existence in the world is the definition of 
~phenomenology." Hence for Merleau-Ponty philosophy proceeds 
through phenomenology, or better, philosophy is phenomenology, 
and no more than that; this is quite sutfici ent. lO So the 
'iuestion what is philosophy for Merleau-Ponty converges upon the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
8Merleau-Ponty, Eloge. • • , 86. 
9.E.f,., ii-iii. 
lOaerbert Spiegelberg notes in The Phenomenological 
M~ovement (Vol, 2; the Hague: Martintls""1lijhoff, 1960), p. 532 n. 
that when Fr. Danielou, at a discussion of one of Merleau-Ponty's 
lectures, introduced a distinction between phenomenological 
description and philosophical system, Merleau-Ponty protested: "I 
qU\Jstiol1 what is il.\erleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology. 
He answers this operatively by what he ~ throughout his 
Phenq~enolog!~ de la Perceetion, and contentually by what he 
say~ in tnt:! all-iiAportunt preface of that work. 
A philosophy th8.t studies phertomena is a phen0menology. 
By tt ph eno.n.enOllIf Marleau-Ponty wants to express "the intima. te 
relation between the objects and the subject and the presence of 
solid structure in both which distinguishes phenomena from mere 
appearances. "11 He cites the later Husserl to whom the idea of 
, 
uLebenswolt" or "lived-world" as so important. But here he 
does not hesitate to interpret Husserl in the light of his own 
insigpts. He insists upon the later, non-idealistic Husserl 
because for Marleau-Ponty the world is "already there" as an 
inalienable presence which precedes reflection or any analysi8 
-vvhich one can make of it .12 1tThe real must be described and 
not constructed or constituted."l) r.The whole effort of 
phenomenology is to recover this nai va contact with the world 
and to gi va it finally a philosophical status. It is a 
Ilc. va never thoug;ht th&t phenomenology was nothing but an intro-
duction to philosophy, I believe that it is philosophy." The 
point is that by ?fdescribingft one is explaining. By the use of 
words one is both allowing phenomena to appear and is stMlcturing 
(sy~~temi:;itizint::) phenOl1.lena. 'l'hese C<3.n he looked at as two 
moments, but are really one and the same act. The result of 
pheuoU1t:nolo15ical description is system, not a finished, static 
system, but a growing organiC system. This will be treAted more 
fully below. 
ll§..c., 215. 
1 ') 
"-.f..P., i, iv. 
13!:.!:.., i v. 
philosophy intent upon being an exact sCience, but it is also 
the account of space, of time, and of the world as 'lived.,"14 
Phenomenological description is "above all a disavowal 
of science," he insists. 15 By this he wants to return to the 
world before the scientific or common sense world. It is a 
return to "the things in themselves," as Husserl said, which for 
Merleau-Ponty means a return "to that world prior to knowledge 
and of which knowledge speaks. nl6 The radical reflection 
desired is a "reflebtion on the non-reflective."l? What must be 
indicated in this description is the lived-world. This means he 
wants to return, for' example, to his love for a friend as it is 
in itself in his experience of actual lov.ing, and not to a 
scientific or common sense account ot love. Or again, knowing 
and the account of knowing are two different things. One "knows" 
l4f..f.., i. 
15f..p., ii. By this some have interpreted Merleau-Ponty 
as being antr-scientific (for example, Edward G. Ball.ard, "The 
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty," Studies in Hj,el /Tulane Studies 
in Philosophy; New Orleans: Tulane Univers ty, I96~/, 162.). 
Nothing could be farther trom the truth. Merleau- onty is 
simply asserting that the scientific, objective method is not 
sufficient when dealing with man who has subjective dimensions; 
he desires to go beyond the world of science to the toundatlon.al 
world. He is in constant touch with the sciences, especially 
the human sciences, and uses their data to corroborate his 
philosophic reasoning, although he wants to surpass science and 
thus ground it in a phenomenology. One man speaks of him: 
"There is no man more indebted to science, particularly is the 
form of psychology, and yet less inclined to surrender to it." 
(Ben-Ami Schartstein, "Bergson and Merleau-Ponty: A Prelimi~~~ 
Comparison," Journal ~ Philosophr, LII, No. 14 ~uly 7, 19~, 
380.). 
16 E..E.., iii. 
l7,E.,E., iv. 
I.IU<:J d",,,l:j anu oDJec1;s or knowing and loving in the very living 
out of these acts, even though he does not know them formally. 
It is this ~ ven or "lived n l .... orld to which the phenomenologist 
wants to return to see things as they are in themselves. He 
wants to return to the unified act or tact of subject and world 
in which epistemological language is called "perception" and 
which is ontologically termed "existence": the etre-~-monde. 
For Husserl the Ehenomenological reduction was a further 
development of Desca.rtes' methodic doubt in that it "bracketed" 
the world; in this way it gave rise to idealism. For Merleau-
Ponty the reduction, by negating our habitual relations with 
the world constituted by the classical prejudices of idealism 
or realism, permits the discovery of the life-world in all its 
"facticity.nlg The eidetic reduction for Husserl means the 
passing from the fact of our existence (Dasein) to the essence 
of our existence (Wesen). But the reduction for Merleau-Ponty 
is only a means to catch the facts of existence before they are 
formulated linguistieally. Essences, as separated, are those 
of language. It is the function of language to isolate essences. 
But the primordial meanings of words arise from the experience 
\t>'e have of ourselves. Essences, as isolated, are only apparent 
since they repose on the antepredicative life of consciousness. 
"In the silence of the original consciousness there appear not 
only the meaning ot words but also the meaning of things, that 
core of primary meaning (Signification) around Which are 
19 !.!., v-vii. ct. Spiegelberg, II, 534. 
organized the acts ot naming and expression. n19 To search the 
essence ot consciousness, tor example, is to recover that ettec-
tive presence ot self to oneself, the fact of consciousness 
which is what the word and concept of consciousness ultimately 
mean. 20 Likewise seeking the essence of the world 1s to seek 
what it is in tact tor us prior to all formulation. "The world 
is not what I think, but that whIch 1 I1ve.~t21 
And so intentionaiitl 1s discovered as the baEic struc-
ture of consciousness, not only 1n so tar as different human 
acts are always directed toward an object, but in so rar as the 
operAtive intentionality (lntentionalite 02erante) underlies our 
whole relo.tion with the world ot persons and things. It 
establishes the natural and ante-predicative unity of the world 
22 and our life. Consciousness which is "con6ciollsness of" 1s 
not to be looked upon only as inhering in each act, but as the 
subject or spirit 1n and to aW'Orld. This means th~.t there is 
not really (that is, purely) a subject or spirit or consciousness 
at all, but an existent--an etre-~-monde. 
The notion of phenomenology, like the notions to which 
phenomenology attends, is admittedly ambiguous. These B.re 
notions that cannot be defined by one or t'"l'O stock phrases. They 
must be "worked back upon" by B. number of statements and by a 
whole context which points to the fact to be grasped. It is only 
19 !.t., x. 
21!.!., xii. 
20Ibid • 
22p.p., xi1i. 
by entering the totality and going through the motions that the 
point to be understood is "indicated." By considering some of 
the misunderstandings and objections to the phenomenology of 
Mer~eau-Ponty, the essence of that phenomenology will stDnd out 
more clearly and one will have grasped, at least inchoatively, 
what philosophy is for Merleau-Ponty. 
One problem turns about Merleau-Ponty's notion of experi-
ence. Is he after all an empiricist? For does he not find the 
ultimate criterion in experience? Is not "perception" the basic 
act to be analyzed, as it was for Berkeley? Is not philosophy 
itself a "description of phenomena"? Phrases of Marleau-Ponty 
taken out of context seem to confirm this objection: "Genuine 
philosophy is re-learning to see the world." "The world is that 
which I percel ve." "The real must be described not constructed 
or constituted. That means I cannot assimilate perception into 
syntheses which are of the order of judgment, of acts, or of 
predication."2) Words take their meaning within the whole 
context or system, not just from a one to one correspondence with 
isolated impressions. And 80 it is with Marleau-Ponty's words: 
"experience" by which he does not merely mean "sense-experience"; 
"perception" which is not equivalent to, say, Hume's "perception"; 
"phenomenon" which is not a mere appearance in the mode of Kant 
or Hume. Experience and perception is for [~erleau-Ponty a 
"knowledge" before knowledge; it is a "presence"; it is conscious-
ness and its data. And, again, this is not an isolated 
23 p f.._., iv. 
consciousness, but a presence to ~elr in its presence to the 
other. 24 
The world as t'lived" is not merely the stlnsed 'tfOrld. It 
is the ~orld ",ith which I am in contact before, so to speak, any 
imposi tion of categorie s. The: body through 'Mh ieb I attain and 
live my world is not the body I look at and organize scientif-
ically or a.ccording to common sense. My body is the body I live 
and am before such organization. Hence tha ~lived world" is 
not the ~'l/o!"ld of common sense, the ordina ry world, the world of 
"ordin3.ry language. ,,25 It is the pre-predicative, "silent I' 
world from wh:i.ch these other symbolic 1~orld8 arise. 
24The relation ot Merleau-Ponty's notion of experience 
with that of John Dew~y has often been noted (cf. Spiegelberg, 
524). Here "experience is an all-embracing notion from which 
and '~ithinwhieh and to which r~rlection takes place. A man's 
expIJrience includes his whole history a& well as his here and 
now perceptions. Even his retlection upon experi~nce is a part 
of experience; hence reflection and experience should not be 
considered as two i!olable levels of knowledge. \Vhen t~e phi-
losopher attempts to indicate what belongs to experience, he 
breaks it up; he mu.'3t c·::>nstantly insist that, while these things 
are present in experience, experience itselt is an undifferenti-
ated whole. Therefore, when one ~tatee that the real is in 
experience "prior- to reflection, he might be called an 
tfemp1ricist-; but this is far different from the empiricism or 
Hume. Here experience 18 lite or the total! ty of human acti vi ty. 
Dewey \"1rite9 that experience is "'double-barrelled' in that :it 
recognizee in its primary integrity no distinction between act 
and material, subject and object, but contains them both in en 
u~analyzed totality." (Ewrience and Nature LNew York: Dover, 
l':l5.§j, 6.). 
25Cf. John Wild, "Is there a World of Ordinary Language?~ 
The Philoso;hical Review, LXVII (October, 1958), 460-476. He 
says that p enoDlenology 8spiresto describe the world of' ordinary 
language, that is, the world expressed by one's everyday French 
or English. which common sense world is the foundation ror the 
world of science. This does not quite seem to be Merleau-Ponty'. 
intention. He wishes to find his basis in man's act of Erasance 
to all these worlds. It is this presence or act or intentionality 
It is a t this point that the wetghtiest assa;Jlt upon 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty is launched. How can one 
have cognition (as philosophy ia) of the pre-cor:nitive726 
Merleau-Ponty has said, "My reflection is a reflection on the 
i'?hich constitutes the primordial world from which even the world 
of ordinary language springs. He says: "Truth does not merely 
reside in the 'inner l!l8.n.' Rather there is no inner man. For 
man is to the world and it is in the world that he knows himself. 
'dhen I turn upon myself from th e dogmatism of common sense or 
the dogt!1atisJ1l of science I rind not the hOIlJ.e of inner truth, but 
a subject committed to the world." (P.P., v. Italics mine.) 
fllerleau-Pontyt 5 primordial world is not -exactly the world of 
ordinary lan~age. 
R.L. Dreyfus and S. J. Todes ("The Three Worlds ot 
Merleau-Ponty," Phiiosophl and Phenomenological liesearch, XXII, 
No.4 LJune, 1962/, 559-5 5r-iry to reconcile Wild saying that 
lJlerleau-Ponty seeks "an accurate description of the concrete 
phenomena of the Lebenswelt as they are experienced and expressed 
in or·dinary langpage" and Kullman and Taylor who said tho..t 
i'olerleau-Ponty attempts the "discovery and exploration of the 
world not such as everyday and scientific discourse describe it 
but of the 'pre-objective world' which it presupposes." They do 
this by finding three worlds in the doctrine of Marleau-Ponty: 
the originative and pre-objective world ot the tundierende 
( "intentionalit e operante"), the lUore stable Leoenswelt, and the 
stable and idealized world of science. Wild contuses the first 
t~;o in one; Kullman and Taylor confuse the latter two. This 
analysis of Dreyfus and Todes has much to commend itself, 
especially the view of the Lebenswelt as a synthesis of the 
pre-objective and the scientIfic (totally objective) worlds. 
However, it seems that one can still speak accurately of two 
worlds in Marleau-Ponty, the pre-objective and the objective, in 
so far as one views the world as originative or being objectified, just 8S one might view lan~age from the viewpoint of the 
speaking-act or from the vi ewpoint of that-which-is-spoken. 
In this sense, Merleau-Ponty would speak of the presence or the 
pre-objective world in all types of symbolic worlds. And it is 
this which grounds his distinction between Rar019 and langue 
which will be taken up later. 
26See Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor, "The Pre-
o~jective World!" The Review of Metaphidics, XII, No.1 
(~eptember, 1956), ~-IJ2. Alio, Edwa G. Ballard, "On 
Cognition of the Pre-Cognitive," PbilosoRhical Quarterly, 
July, 1961). 
non-reflecti ve (irreflec:li). >1 How can one in the ceet of knowing 
"return to that wor ld prior to knowledge"? Ianguage--lVierl Gau-
PonGY \'!ould flgree with Benj,:,min \'}hcrf--involves C!9.tef,£orios. How 
can the phenomenologist describe in linguistic terms the pre-
predicative existing before any imposition of categories, the 
"pre-logical act by which the subject comes to be at home in his 
'I"lorld"? Does not thls \:whole &ttettpt to describe this foggy 
realm bespeak of poetry or even myth? 
In this respect it is important to understand what 
l'-lerleau-Ponty means by the world rtbetore!! reflection, the pre-
cognitive, etc. This, it seems, is to be understood as a 
logical priority rather than n temporal priority, except when 
speaking of the temporal priority with regards to Ehilosophlc 
reflection. There is no ti8.c. when a man is totally and only 
in the lived-world. Either it must be said that there is no 
lived-world, no consciousness, no subjectivity i£ man 1s not 
thematizing or symbolizing or "in-tending" an object. Later it 
vvill be shown that man' 5 relation to his world is by means of 
"symbolic forms." But the basis for this thematization through 
symbolization is the act of presence viewed bare and simple. 
tnd in this sense one is always perceiving, always in the 
lived-world and "lOving out from perception and the lived-world, 
v/hen he is in the world of science, common sense, art, or any 
other symbolic interpretations of the world. So, the lived-
"'Torld and the symbolic-world, perception and predication should 
not be looked upon as two separable levels. These are mutually 
The bolie world 1s found onl in the context of 
the lived-world End, conversely, perception is located only in 
the context of communicat1. on Or' symboliz~tion. 
But, again, '-vhat is this irreflechi ;.;nd how can it be 
vnlidly descrl bed 1n refl,ecti va terms? Here is 1JIlhere the phi-
losophy of j~erle2u-Ponty 1s very disappointing to many of a 
~1athematical mentality for tmom symbols and rules must be given 
0ne definition ·~nd all the fo110hing steps ;uust be logically 
"'put on p;;iper." But while philosophy is scient1fl c, it ne.sd not 
take the physical [':ciences or mathematics for its {nodal. In 
fact the obj ect of philoso phy, th e ir diflochi or prlL~ary presence, 
excludes this approach. Dna must ~wcrk back" on the reality. 
~!ords::re not used \dth an absolute or static or isolated 
.:leaning, but hE.va th::; function of point out or indicating the 
presence of the unnar.aeb,~lf: reality found in primary Gxperience. 
H2nce metaphor 113 useful. Moreover, there is the process of 
negation. Given the fact of being in this particular syatem 
of symbols and ,~tt~tllpting to work bacl~ ;~ thin this symbolic 
systa-;t to its basis, one proceeds by negating aspects and 
15.':11 tation of this system. Thus the "mole notion of the r'non-
r'eflect1vA," (irreflechi). This is, after alIt the meaning of 
t.he reduction; a process of negati ve judgments to work back on 
I'things in themselves" in primary experience. And if this use 
of Illetaphor and negation partakes of the characteristics or 
'1myth:1 or "poetry, tt this need not be 50 disconcerting. For the 
philosopher is not merely trying to build a conceptual system; 
he is trying to express primary experience which is inexpressible 
in concepts. And so he comes to express himselt in negations, 
exhortations, and extended metaphors; tor truth can be comprehen-
ded only in its "esthetic" and variable whole. 27 While the 
verification of many of Merleau-Ponty's statements is to be 
found by having recourse to the whole from Which they take 
meaning, still the verification ot phenomenology as a whole is 
in phenomenology itselt. 28 The philosopher must be constantly 
returning to primary experience the farther he gets away trom 
that experience. In this sense it is true to say that "the 
philosopher is a perpetual beginner."29 For the philosopher 
must be "engaged" in the world, at the same time he is above the 
world, finding and giving it meaning. Hence action and specu-
lation must converge, just as "poetry" and science converge, in 
philosophy. The philosopher can go only so far in indicating 
the facts by negation and metaphor. In the end philosophy must 
halt, having been led to a sort ot "astonishment before the 
world. nJO For philosophy is a process ot selt-liberation Which 
270f. Dewey (Experience and Nature, 6): "This empirical 
method I shall call the denotative-method. That philosophy is a 
mode of reflection. often or a subtle and penetrating sort J goes 
wi thout saying. The charge that is brought against the non-
empirical method of philosophizing is not that it depends upon 
theorizing, but that it fails to use refined, secondary products 
as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary 
experience." Dewey's conception of philosophy is also the act 
of "indicating" or "denoting" the reality in primary experience. 
The concepts or "secondary products" are not to be taken as 
"real" in and of themselves, but as referring back to the 
primary experience or the reader "before" reflection. Thus the 
real is in experience; and a statement attains the real or is 
"true," When it can be verified in experience. 
28t .t ., xvi. 29~.~., ix. JOp.P., viii. 
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has led a man to transcend his world at the same time as he i& 
engaged in it, by allowing him to "learn again to see things 
well." In this "it is true to say that [Philosophy realizes 
itself only in destroying itself as a separated philosophy_ For 
here it is necessary to fall silent. For only the hero lives 
out to the utmost his relation to men and the world; and no one 
else need speak in his name."3l 
Structure of Behavior 
Again, the problem is the problem of getting a hold of 
oneself and onets world. The question 1s What are the "relations 
between consciousness and nature." This is the question con-
cerning the relations between man and his env.1ronment--a 
question of behavior. To answer this question Merleau-Ponty in 
his Structure !! Comportement goes to science and its data for 
help, and especially to the science of psychology. 
He begins with an analysis of the behaviorist school 
which he partially accepts, but finally rejects as inadequate 
in the light of modern Gestalt psychology (which also must be 
carried a bit farther to prove adequate). Behaviorism considers 
behavior as a collection of atomistic reactions causally produced 
by stimuli equally atomistic. What such a conception does is 
reduce behavior to a mosaic of individual reflex-facts whose 
origin can be tr&ced and explained term by term in each of the 
corresponding elements of the stimulus process. To each 
-collection of physical causes responds a collection of reactions. 
Such a conception has already been surpassed by the works of 
Kohler and Goldstein. These Gestaltists appeal to the notion 
of form or totality irreducible to its elements. This is the 
-
holistic conception which finds the organism a dynamic whole 
which does not act piece-meal but ~ a whole. Behavior, in 
this conception, should be viewed as the whole organism coming 
to terms wi th its environment. 
The surpassing of behaviorism is to be found in the 
assault upon the reflex theory for lower types of behavior and 
upon the conditioned-reflex theory for higher types of behavior. 
This assault is to be made through scientifically controlled 
experimentation, as Kohler and Goldstein have done. One example 
of the difficulties of the behaviorist-mechanistic approach is 
the theory of localizations where it is urged that specific 
behavioral functions can be determined to a specific locus of 
the organism. 32 But the facts do not allow this analysis into 
isolable elements. "More and morl! one notices that the different 
nerve regions correspond, not to certain real parts of behavior--
to certain words or to a certain reflex: defined by its stimulus, 
but to certain types or levels of activity."33 Following 
Goldstein, Merleau-Ponty synthesizes the data according to tested 
prinCiples one of which is that a cerebral leSion, even a 
32.§ • .Q. 66-67. 
33.§ • .Q. 19. 
localised one, "is able to determine disturbances of structure 
which involve the whole of behavior; and analogously disturbances 
of structure are able to be provoked by lesions situated in 
different areaS of the skin. n34 For example, an aphasiac cannot 
be influenced to pronounce a certain isolated word, but can 
pronounce this \fIOrd in &. sentence. It is not that one part of 
one's behavior is eliminated or changed by a lesion, but one's 
behavior 8,S a W1ole. 35 The point to be grasped by the analysis 
of localizations 1s that localization of a performance is not 
simply an excita.tion in a certain place; it is a dynamic process 
occurring in the entire nervous system and the entire organism; 
it hab a definite fOIm or Gestalt for each performance. 
Beh&vior is & Gestalt; it is the process of the organism as a 
whole coming to teruiR with its environmmt. 
Now Marleau-Ponty attempts to discover and formulate the 
types of behavior-forms. He describes three forms or behavior 
which he feels are irreducible to each other. The first torm, 
characteristi c of the level of lower organisms, he calls 
~rncretic. This forrJ1 keepu the animal imprisoned in his natural 
conditions. The animal will react only if, corTect1y or not, it 
discovers in the conditions set up an allusion to the natural 
51 tUf,tlon.)6 Here the animal ca.nnot "abstract" a structure or 
the situation Which can be reproduced from a difr~Tent matter. 
"'4 ) .§..Q. 66. 35 .§.£. 73. 
36A• De\vaelens, .!!!l! Philosophie!!! LtAmbigulte (l.ouvain, 
1951), p. 27. 
Stimulus and response are tied so closely to the situati.on that 
allY change in the stimulus will prevent the response. The 
animal is so perfectly adapted that 1 t C2.nnot solve any problem 
of adaptation. It cannot beh&ve analogically, it cannot find 
in different circumst:~mc<;s 3. aim.ila r structure--simila r not in 
the elelll.ents of tho structure J but in the relations of ele.'nents.3 
'rheae properti~s ~ possessed by ttremovabl ~'t behavioral 
forms characteristi c of th e high er animals. Here the animal 
exhibit;3 behavioral patterns relatively independent olthe cir-
cumstances. )'ihat distint:,uishes this type of behavior from the 
first is the apperception 2! signals. "fts soon as signals are 
~een to appear in the history of behavior which are not deter-
rr~ned by the instinctive settings of space, it can be presumed 
that they are baaed apon structureS rcl&tively independent of 
the materials in \"/hich they are realized. ,,38 A given situ.s.tion 
becorues ~ Sign or a situational-type. And the det3rmining 
factor of behavior is no longer the identical stimulus, but ita 
Gestalt in rel=~tion to the total situ3.tion. Thle ability to 
perceive sii::na1s does not ,!lean th(~ animal can abstract from its 
!llaterial situation, from its here-and-no,/. It cannot represent 
fictitious Situations, but treats all situations &8 real. 
\'fuat an. animal cannot do is use signs in order tl) repre-
sent something fictitious or imaginary. Signs indic&te things 
to the animal as the bell indicated food to Pavlov's dog. But 
a man can represent absent things, can use signs that take the 
373.0. 115. 
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38D8 W.elens, 29. 
place of things, ean abstract the here and now by representation, 
can shift his frame of reference at his own initiative. Human 
behavior differs from animal behavior in that it :is symbolic. 
Hence, t.he third type of forms descrihed by Marleau-Pont,y are 
called "symbolic" forms. 
The apes describ(~d. by Kohler quickly learned to pile up 
boxes in order to :reach an ob,1ect!.ve placed out of rerlch. But in 
countless attC'!!l1pts they did not succeed In b!lilding a systematic 
and stublf~ odifice; for they could not comprehend 51 tunttons 
v-rhlch v\'Ould be sYi'lbols of tnstab11ity for men. For ,.mile 
ani:nals sense th~ir Olfln €t1uili.brium, their mm stability and 
instabili ty, they c~nnot make vLsna 1. stimuli repr~5ent intero-
ceptive stimuli. 39 ~. man, on the other hr.tnd, pt"!rceivns 
nr'lb')ltcallYi though only one slde of~t coin i5 perceived, it 
stan·js for the ot. her ~~d e t the whole cain as'1(el1. "-Then a man 
walks .~ round :.!nd i11.thin his holts e, though he sees only one 
fa cade vf j. t at 8. time, this represents the tot ali ty to him so 
that a 11 othe r facades a re present to him and unl ted in this 
thing he call' "house. ~40 It is this symbolic c~aracter of 
behavior that defines IMn, sett1.ng him above t he beast and 
grounding the possibility of the various r~rm8 of symbolic 
activity. Man is a symbol-using a~lmal. 
After. this analysis of th$ forms of behavior, 
39cr. f.t. 81-86. 
543. This thought is certainly 
-Merleau-Ponty proceeds to distinguish and relate different orders 
of nature. He indicates three: the physical, the biological or 
vital, and the human. Each of the orders is a new integration 
of the preceding; it does not require new substantial principles, 
but marely a restructuring of behavior. One moves from the 
level of nature Which is characterized by an equilibrium of 
external factors to a new integration in the order of life. 
Here is found a holistic-dynamic equilibrium in the organism 
that is further subsumed in the level of spirit (.serit) in 
which the equilibrium of forms becomes dependent on man's 
intention as expressed in the cultural world. The basis of this 
spiritual realm is freedom where the organism can detach itself 
from the conditions of the psychophysical organism (self-
consciousness) and from the total i_rsion in the environment 
(ability to objectify through Symbolization).4l 
From here Marleau-Ponty applies his findings to his 
original problem the relation of consciousness to nature, as 
classically conceived in the problem of body and soul. He opts 
for a pOSition between idealism and empiricism subsuming them 
both. And while he points the way to a holistic conception of 
man, the total answer to his original problem can be solved 
only upon an analysis of the human act "between" man and his 
world, unifying man and the world. This is perception. It i. 
by means of a systematic phenomenology of perception, which 
will allow the activity of man in his world to come to light, 
41 0 f.. f.. 2 ). 
that the answer to his question is to be tound. 
Perception 
This syatemat1.c phenomenology ot perception is the 
effort of Merleau-Ponty's second major work, the Phenomenologie 
~ la Perception. The phenomenology ot perception has a central 
place in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty simply because ot the 
primacy of perception itself. By "primacy" he does not mean 
its prerogative or eXClusive right to settle problems or 
ambiguities nor does he mean its temporal priority. He means 
tha~ perception, as the basic act between man and the world, 
constituting in a sense both man and the world, is the gI'Ol!Dd 
for all knowledge, for reality itself. He also means that the 
study of perception is the basi. or foundational study for all 
the symbolic activities of man, and specifically that of science. 
Merleau-Ponty begins his Phenominologie in a dialectical 
tashion--rejecting the "classical prejudi ces" ot empiricism 
and idealism. Both haye their base in what he calls the 
"prejudi ce of the world" which assumes a pure sensation and a 
pre-given objective world conSisting ot meaningless sense data 
which associate pa~sively or are put together by attention or 
judgment to form the world. This "prejudice" or false assumption 
arises trom a mechanistic view ot a one-to-one correspondence 
of stimuli with sensations. Again Merleau-Ponty employs the 
findings ot the Gestaltists to exorcise this illusion. He rinds 
that perceptions are not dependent on external stimuli as causes, 
-/ 
but on a holistic context of figure-ground cons:i.sting in the 
acting-reacting of the Whole organism in its whole environment. 
From this context perceptions already have a meaning (.!.!!!! by 
which he means a form or Gestalt or even an essence). Moreover 
they are open and ambiguous, not like a group of pellets stuck 
together. 
Having rejected the traditional counter-positions, 
Marleau-Ponty is ready to walk the narrow way between, which 
unites and founds the truth of both empiricism and idealism. 
His aim is to grasp the pre-reflective act of perception found 
between and constitutive of man and his world "before," or in 
the very context of, reflecting and thematizing the worlds of 
sci ence, of art, etc. But si nc e he hopes to grasp this percep-
tion as it is in itself before reflection and word-using, he is 
forced to use metaphor and negation to indicate the reality 
beyond the words he is using. He attempts to grasp this act as 
a unified whole by first looking at it from the side of man in 
the analysis of the perceiving-perceived body, secondly on the 
side ot the world as perce! ved, thirdly by synthesizing the t we 
sides in the etre-~-~onde, existence or presence, which is the 
unified whole found between and founding the two sides. 
Th e fir st part d ea! s wi th man a s body vi ewed a s man t s 
characteristic access to the world. Again Marleau-Ponty rejects 
mechanistic physiology simply because it does not account for 
the experience of the body, an experience brought to light by a 
consideration of pathological experiences. By this Merleau-
Pont ho es to show that man's ex erience of his bod ia 
determined by his mod e of existence, that he has a bodily exist-
ence which underlies a 11 his experience. The last chapter of 
this first part sums up and completes his findings. It is a 
consideration of the body as expression; that is, as an openness 
or intention to the "\fJOrld. "''''e M.ve come to recognize the body 
as a unity distinct from that of a scien.tific object. ~1Te have 
just discovered even in its tsexual function' an intentionality 
and a power of Signification. In searching to describe the 
phenomenon of the word (la E!role) and the explicit act ot 
signification; we will have the opportunity to pass definitively 
beyond the classic dichotomy of subj ect and object .• "42 In other 
words, Merleau-Ponty sees in the phenomenology of expression or 
significati on or 18 parole the answer to the primary problem he 
set for himself at the beginning of the Structure 5!!:! Comportement: 
the alienation of man and world, l! conscience ~ !! nature. 
In the second part, Merleau-Ponty explores the perceived 
world. This is not merely a construct of passively received 
sensations, but that in which man is angaeed. Hence space is 
related to the mode of bodily existence: even things are related 
in their constancy to the constancy present to a person in his 
body. The thing opens up into a "natural l«>rld" which is the 
horizon or background of things. But a new dimension is 
discovered in the human or cultural world which is the constant 
context even of fnan's perception of things. And so in the last 
42 f..f. 414. 
chapter of this section, Marleau-Ponty analyzes "the Other and 
the human world"; tor he finds in the act of communication with 
other persons a basis for a presence to the world. This is why 
an tsolated, solipsistic philosophy is impossible. "Even the 
thought-which aims for a universality and severs the philosopher 
from his nation, his friends, his biases, his empirical being, 
in a world, from his world and which appears to leave him 
absolutely alone--even this is really activity, speaking, and 
conse1.uently dialogue. ,,43 In his reflective retreat from the 
Iflorld, the philosopher cannot help but to involve others !fbeca.use 
in the obscurity of the world he has learn ad forever to trent 
them as consortes and because all his knowledge is built upon 
that datum of belief. n44 
.. ,; 
The last section of the Phenomenoloiie ~ ~ Perception 
in a sense leaves the perception of the body and of the world to 
search out its metaphysical principle or the condition of its 
possibility. This he finds by replacing the Cartesian cogito 
with the new casito: A the ~-!!-mondet being present-to-and-
within-th~-world. There the world and consciousness are 
mutually dependent and 8re constitutive of and constituted by a 
~ertiu~ gu1d, existence; it is third only in that it includes 
the other two in synthesis. This section is to the preceding 
what Part Two in Heidegger's Being ~ Ii!! is to Part One. 
First, man and world were investigated on the horizontal, spatial 
plane; secondly, in the vertical, ten."poral dimension. i'or one 
44f.. p • 519. 
sees that it is by man's communication out to the world that he 
......... 
progresses ~ in time so that temporality as well as spatiality 
constitutes the engaged subject; the itre-~.monde. It is this 
which grounds his freedom. For though he is always in a context 
(always ~-monde), still by always coming to terms with his 
world, by thematizing it, he gets a hold of his present context 
and thus moves beyond it into the future. Merleau-Ponty writes 
near the end of his last chapter: "I have received with my 
existence a certain manner of existing, a style. All my actions 
and all my thoughts are in keeping w.1th this structure. And 
even philosophic thought itself is but a way of making explicit 
one's hold on the world, and what he is. And nevertheless I am 
free, not in spite of, or this side of these motivations, but by 
means of them. For this signifying life, this certain significa-
tion of nature and of history Which I am, does not limit my 
access to the world. On the contrary it is my means of communi-
cating with it. n45 
The preceding does not pretend to be an adequate expose 
or even summary of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. It was meant to 
point out the central position of the symbolic act or the act 
of expression in his philosophy. So in the ~tructure ~ 
Comportement it was observed that man is distinguished from the 
rest of nature in that his behavior is symbolic. And in 
analyzing further the relations of man and world under the 
formality of perception, first man was seen as a body open to 
the world in the act of expression (1!. parole); secondly the 
world was found as being meaningful already because of its 
relation to the expressing subject; and thirdly it was discovered 
thDt in this act of communicating is constituted man's progres-
sive Gelf-liberation whereby he achieves hi8 manhood. It is no 
wonder, then, that Merleau-Ponty after the publication of the 
Phenomenologie ~ 1! Perception was primarily concerned with a 
phenomenology of language. It flows naturally from his work to 
sum up 8nd continue that work. It is this central act of man 
to his world under the forillality of expression or speaking 
Cl!. parol~}, as it is found in the central chapter of the 
Phenomenoloraie 2! 1! Perception and in a key essay of the later 
Merleau-Ponty, that the subsequent chapters of this paper will 
treat. 
CHAPTER II 
LANGUAGE AND HUHAN EXISTENCE 
The approach to a subject determines its analysis and 
final conclusions. It is true for Merleau-Ponty's language theory; 
Merleau-Ponty, following the lead of Saussure, opts for a 
"holistic" approach. He attempts to catch the total language act 
before an analysis into parts. This way the linguist does not 
find lan~age as a collection of isolable meaning-packets. On the 
contrary, he finds that the meaning of each word is constituted 
only within the total language context. Moreover, the holistic 
linguist attempts to catch the two aspects of language termed by 
Sau8sure the "langae" and the "parole."1 The langue is the social 
aspect ot language; the parole is the individual aspect. Saussure 
demonstrates how these two aspects interact. It is only through 
individuals, each in a different circumstance, each speaking in a 
somewhat unique fashion (parole), that a common language (langue) 
develops. The dictionary freezes language in its social aspect 
giving the impression that words are fixed forever. But the 
dictionary constantly demands revision because of the originality 
of individual speakers. They are progressively investing old 
words with new meanings; the,r are forever creating new words. 
lMaurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 
pp. 107-108. 
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Merleau-Ponty adopts the terminology and concf'ption of 
Saussure but invests it with an even wider significance. The 
langue or social aspect of lan~l~ge Merleau-Ponty calls "language 
as object of thought."2 It is lan~Rge as put out apart from the 
speaker. It is formalized or thematized. It is out there for all 
men, so to speak. The parole, on the other hand, is language in 
the process of being spoken, as it is originating from individual 
speakers. It is "language as my own.") The lan@Je is language a8 
having been spoken; the E,arole is language as being spoken. The 
langue 1s the words existing in themselves apart from the speaker; 
the parole is the individual speaking act formulizing itself. The 
langue is the word (l!~) as uttered, in a total formalized 
language system; the p!role is the word (le~) which is breaking 
the Silence, emerging out of nothingness, creating a world.4 
These are two aspects of 1ang,uage (langage) for which an adequate 
science of language must account. 
Both empiricist and intellectualist psychology are inade-
quate in their explanations of the language phenomenon because 
2Ibid., p. 107. 
)Ibid., ltPouvons-nous simplement juxtaposer les deux per-
spectives sur Ie langage que nous venons de distinguer, --Ie 
langage comme objet de pensee et Ie langage comme mien? C'est ce 
que fai.ait par exemple Saussure, quand il distinguait une llngu-
istlque synchronique de la parole et une linguistlque dlaehronlque 
de 1a langue ••• " 
4In the Phenomenologle de la percertion Marleau-Panty 
uses a slightly different terminology to d stinguish the two 
aspects of language. He speaks ot the parole earlante and the 
parole parlee: the word in the act of speaking and the word as 
spoken. This terminology stresses the subject-object aspects ot 
language. The lan~ue/ parole terminology stresses the personal-
communal aspects 0 language. P. P •• P. 229. 
-they ha va neglected the k!role in favor of' the langu~. Both are 
so engrossed in object-language that they neglect the subjective 
speaking act which is origina tive of object .. languag~. An exami-
nation of these faulty theories ,·d.ll help outline the adequate 
conception of language. 
Empiricist thought considers language to be no more than 
the actual existence of verbal images.5 Language consists of 
tr~.ces left by "lOrds spoken and heard. Speech is a circuit of 
external phenomena. There is no speaker, but only a flow of words 
,,,,hose meaning is gi VEn with stimuli. Speech is not a human action 
Man speaks as a light becomes incandescent. The word itself has 
no meaning; it is merely the response to individual atimuli whence 
comes all meaning. In empiricist thought man t s act of expressing 
has no importance. The emphasis is placed upon his reception of 
ideas or sensible stimuli. Words are responses to such stimuli.. 
They are meaningful only if they can be individually connected 
with these stimuli. 
An intellectualist psychologist, such as Kurt Goldstein, 
can refute the empiricist on his own ground-experimentally. 
Under the light that comes trom a scientific analysis of aphasia, 
the empiricist thesis disintegrates. Aphasia, usually caused by 
a cerebral lesion in the frontal lobe of the cortex, is the 
incapacity to name objects. This incapacity is not due to a dis-
turbance of recognition since patients unable to name, say, an 
umbrella may describe its use. Nor is it due to a loss of words 
- .),1 
since the patient unable to name the umbrella put betore him may 
use its name in a sentence such as "I have two umbrellas at home."6 
"What the patient has lost and what the normal person possesses is 
not a certain stock of words but a certain way of using them."7 
The word is present to the patient when a concrete purpose must be 
fulfilled. But it cannot be evoked if there is no vital or emo-
tional bearing. From the total behavior of the patient the 
function of meaning is clarified. He is found to be acting in the 
world in a purely practical, non-speculative way. For example, he 
is found unable to group different colored ribbons under a color 
category, though he may group them according to some unasked for 
attribute. There is revealed here an attitude which differs from 
that of the normal person. And this attitude is a function of 
speech which conditions it. What the aphasiac has lost and what 
the normal person retains is the ability to abstract or categorize. 
The patient has lost the "categorical attitude" and retains only 
the "concrete attitude." A person is in the abstract or categor-
ical attitude when he thinks about things and when his reaction i8 
determined, not by the demands of the given object, but by the 
demands of the category which it represents for him. In the 
concrete attitude a person manipulates objects more than he thinks 
about them; and his reactions are determined by the individual 
6p. p ., 204-205. Cf. Goldstein, Kurt, "The Nature of 
Language," In Lan~age: An EnNuiri into Its Meaninf and Function 
edited by Ruth Na~a Ansnen,ewo~ Harper (19 7r;-la-j4. 
, 7P.f., 204. nee que Ie malade a perdu, ce que Ie normal 
possede, ce n'est pas un certain stock de mots, c'est une certain 
maniere d'en user." 
-claims of the g1 ven object. 8 While the normal person acts with 
both these attitudes, the child has not yet acquired the abstract 
attitude and the aphasiac has lost it. 
In the abstract attitude, language plays its primary role. 
Through words experiences are categorized and a world is formed. 
"For to name a thing is to tear oneself away from its individual 
and unique characteristics, to see it as a representative of an 
essence or a category; and the fact that the patient cannot identi-
fy the color sample is a sign, not that he has lost the verbal 
image or the words "red" or "blue," but that he has lost the 
general ability to subsume a sense-datum under a category, that he 
has lapsed back from the categorical to the concrete attitude."9 
And this, of course, is the antithesis of the verbal-image theory 
of the empiricist. For words are not mere responses to external 
sense stimuli whence come all meaning. They are the means of 
detaching oneselt trom sense-experience. They are the means ot 
organizing the world. 
In 80 tar as the aphasiac has lost the power to name 
objects, he has lost the power to symbolize. He is no longer able 
to form a world. He loses creativity, initiatlve, and the 
8Goldsteln. 22. 
9p.p., 205. "Car nomaer un objet, c'est arracher a ee 
qu'll a d t lndiVidu et dtunique pour voir en lui Ie representant 
dtune essence ou dtuBe categorie, et si le malade ne peut pas 
nommer les echantillons, ce n'est pas ~u'il ait perdu l'image 
verbale du mot rouge ou du mot bleu"c eat qu t ll a perdu Ie 
pouvolr generale de subsumer un donne sensible aous une 
categorie, c'est,qu'il est retombe de l'attltude eategoriale 
l'attitude concrete." 
capacity for voluntary decision. IO He is deprived of symbolic 
behavior. H~ is deprived of the essential characteristic of 
man. 
Though such data disprove the empiricist t boory, they may 
lead to a faulty intellectua.list interpretation. Both t.he 
empiricist and the intellectualist interpretations are faulty in 
so far as they regard words exclusively in an objectivistic 
manner. They consequently affirm that the word bas no meaning. 
Both are surpassed in the counter-affirmation that the word has 
-
a meaning. II Empiricists say that the \'fOrd ha 8 no concept but 
is a response to stimuli whence comes meaning. Intellectualism 
likewise affirms that the word haa no meaning but is merely the 
external sign of intqrnal recogni ti on ~1. C'h could take plo.ce wi th-
out it and to which it makes no eontributio!l. Though there is 
meaning attached to the word, it is not of the word; the word 1s 
merely the sign of a pr(3-existing meaning or "inner-\,lorc1. ,,12 
Against both of these theories, Merleau-Ponty affirms 
that the word has a meaning. "It speech presupposed thought 
IOQoldstein, 28. 
IIp.p., 206. rtOn depasse done aussi bien l'intellectual-
isme que 1Tempirisme par eette simple remarque que 1e ~ ~ un 
sens." By "have" here Marleau-Ponty does not mean that meanIng 
IiS'omething merely added t·o the word--this is ';mat he 'tfants to 
rerute--, but that meaning constitutes the word or is a pro-jection of the word. Cf. p.P. note, p. 203. "Nous preferons 
tenir compte de l'usage qui donne-iu terme d'itre 1e sens faible 
de Ifexistenee comme cho$Et ou de 1a predication (la table est 
out est grande) at designe par 1e dfavoir 1e rapport du sujet au 
terme dans l~quel i1 se projette (j'ai une idee, j' a1 env1e, j'ai peur)." 
12E, • .f,., 205-206. 
--
through a cognitive intention or a representation, then we could 
not understand why thought tends to the expression as towards its 
completion. ,,13 Nor could we understand why even the most 
.familiar thing a.ppears indeterrninft e so long e.s we have not 
recalled its name. nor 'thy the thinker is some",lllat ignorant of 
his O'r·n thoughts unti 1 he he s formula ted them--a fact exemplifi ed 
by so many ""rit era ... mo begin a book not knowing exactly ~.mere 
they will be led. Marleau-Panty is denying that thoUf!ht and 
speech t.~re t\'JO distinct levels of activity so that one begins to 
function at the completion of the other. He is affirming that 
thinking is speaking, kno~ng is uttering symbols. "The naming 
of objects does not come after their recognition (reconnaissance); 
it is that very recognition."14 One does not first have a 
concept under which he subsumes the object and whi.ch is then 
linked to a certain word by frequent association. But the word 
bears the meaning; and by imposing it on the object one becomes 
conscious of reaching that object. That is why Ii child does not 
know a thing until it i~ named, why the mythic consciousness 
feels it controls objects through their names, why the religious 
IJp.p., 206. !'S1 1a parole presupposait 1a pensee, si 
parler c'etaTt d'aoord se joindre a lfobjet par une intention de 
connaissance ou ~r une representation, cn ne comprendrait pas 
pourquoi Ie pensee tend vera l'expresaion comme vers son acheve-
raent, pourquoi l'objet 1e plus familiar noue parait indeterrnine 
tant que DOUS nren ayons pas retrouve 1e nom, pourquoi Ie 8~jet 
pensant lu.i-meme est dans une sorte d'ignorance de ses pensees 
tant qu'i1 ne les a pas formul6es pour soi ou~meme dites et 
'cri tea J eomme Ie mantra 1 t eXGlIlple d'3 tant d f acri vains qui commen-
cent un livre sans sBvoir au juste ce qu t ils y mettront." 
14p.p., 207. "La denomination des objets ne vient pas 
apres la reconnaissance, elle est la reconnaissance meme." 
consciousness believes that Cod creates through his Word and gives 
man dominion over things by letting him name them. "?hus speech, 
in the speaker, does not translate ready-made thoug.t, but accom-
plishes it. Hl5 To speak ~~rds i6 to allow things to appear; to 
form a language is to g i va a form too the 1Arorld. Meaning comes to 
the \1orld in the very act of spen.king; it is the words themselves 
that bear that meaning. 
Here Merleau-Ponty adds a note. He wants it clear that, 
when he is talking about speech bearing its own meaning, he is 
talking H bout "al1thenti c ~p~p.eh" 'lihich formulates foY' the first 
time. l6 This speeeh is exemplified in the child utt.ering his 
.first word, in tho lover revealinf'~ hia unique feelings, and in 
the author or ph11osophor 'liho rea vakens primordial experience 
which is anterior to tradi t~ .. ons and vf"rbal formulations. It is 
this speeeh tbet 1s identical with thought, not secondary expres-
sion, speech about .flreech. 'z'ihlch lsrgely constitute~, our everyday, 
ordinary lar'lguage. Authentic expression creates end bears its 
own meanings. Unlikp. secnnd2ry expression, it must suffer the 
woes of childbirth as it haltingly and painfu.lly bears new 
meanings out ot present language and experience. 
To verity the f9.et that t1:..lthentie speech bears its O'<f.m 
meaning, it is n'!ceoaary to return to th e phenomenon of speech. 
15Ibid. rAinsi, 18 paI~le, chez celui qui parle, ne tra-
duit p.!\s un.e-r~n8eE' deja faire, ,nais l'acc(')mplit." 
l6P.p., 207. note (2); 208, note (1). "Il Y a lieu, bien 
entendu, de ai5tinguer une parole authentique, qui formula pour 
le premiere tois, et une expression 5econde, lIne pnrole sur des 
des paroles, qui fait l'ordinaire due langage empirque. Seule la 
"'w ,.c~""",, .... + 'CtfA",+:-f"'lUII ~ 11;1 l"IAnAP. " 
It. i S n€'ee~flI~ry to ~ri tj. cil7.t- tt1P' c,rdinl3 ry de~er1.pti O~ cf spe~ch 
yrhiCh ~.11ows o"11y for external rel,~tions between th01\,fht and 
speech. Then it ltl1 11 be 0.1 scov.,:~r ed thc;.t thOl;:ght in the speaker 
is not ;; repres~ntation. The oretor dr)t>5 net. think before 
SpNtkinf. nor even": hile !3re~king. His 5r:~:ech i E· hl. s thou.ght. 
Th:::> "·'oro s t:.~~ffi~f.'l ve~ ".re 'llel~ni n!;s. The 1 iB t E'nc:r n~cd not con-
t1ons. Mor~over the s?l'!eker does not h:: ve to anti.cip.'1tE" or 
visu ... ~li~e A word before he '}se:s it; .just .as he doeH not need to 
visualize his body before he nses it. And reachinz back for a 
word is similar to reaching bact{ to touch a part of ray body.l? 
This last example gives a clue into the nature or spoech. 
In. fact it is no mere ex-B.,,] e. For spealdnp:; 1 e a bodily act and 
expres8ion. Ind.eed it w~s the l!lTlelysie of. the body as lived that 
led Merleau-Ponty to consider speech in the first place. Speech 
brings meaning: into being ,nd carries its rnenntnp- [\ long with 
itself as a bodily gesture be#lrs its own meaning. My bodily 
gesture of anger does not make me th1.nk ot anger in the sense 
that I must associate my state of being with the gesture. It is 
my anger extemalized. The sexual act and expression, ana.lyzed 
earlic:r in the p'h~.!'lel'q.toLi! !Ie l~ p..~r.ception, is not a mere 
sign of love or a bodily state as smoke 1s a sign cf rir~. The 
meaning is incarnated 1n the expression it self. Llkend se the 
linguistic gesture delineates its own meaning. One dO€R not 
have the thought, then. atterwards express it by a word. What 
• 
leads to the illusion that thought is prior to speech is the 
experience ot thought already constituted and expressed which one 
silently recalls to himself. lS But this "ailence" is really 
teaming with words and thia inner life is an inner language. One 
can speak of "pure" thought in the sense of an "intention" to 
speak, the point from which the flow of words spring forth. But 
these moments cannot be separated. The act of speaking and the 
wordS spoken can be distinguished. And the act of speaking 
considered apart from the words spoken is the "silent" act 
called understanding or inSight. But in fact the act and its 
product cannot be separated. To understand is to speak words. 
In 80 far as Merleau-Ponty affirms that verbal la.nguage 
is a bodily gesture, he is consciously refuting the view that 
words follow upon gestures as artifical signs follow upon 
natural signs. He refutes this view by demonstrating that the 
meaningful gestures considered most "natural" and "basic," 
such as the smile or stamping the foot in anger, change troa 
culture to culture. There are no gestures or signs given with 
a human "nature." The body usea gestures (or acts meaningfully) 
in a certain context. And within this context of things and 
other people, signs of emotion and thought are both given to and 
created by a person. Nor does this mean that gestures are 
lS!.!., 213. ~Ce qui nous trompe la-dessus, ce qui noua 
tait eroire a une pensee qui existerait pour 80i avant l'expres-
aion, ce sont l.s pens~.s deja constituees et deja exprimees que 
nous pOUTons rappeler a nous ailencieusement at par leaquelles 
nous donnons l'illusion d'une vie 1nterieure. Mais en realite 
ce silence pretendu est bruissant de paroles, cette vie 
interieure est un langage interieur." 
totally artificial. For the person is thrown into a context 
tmich conditions him. The theory of the logical positivist 1s 
unacceptable when he asserts that verbal signs are artificial 
i J. 
and can be reduced to gestures which are natural signs of emotion-
al expressions. There are no natural signs in man to Which the 
artificial signs can be reduced. This would be true only if the 
anatomical organization of our body produced a cOITespondence 
between specific gestures and given "conscious statea." But 
love or anger is expressed differently by a Japanese and an 
Occi~ental. ttn fact the difference ot behavior corresponds to a 
difference in! the emotions themselves. The Japanese amiles in 
anger; the wlesteri'er ~tamp8\h~sfoot. "'It is not enough tor two 
\ conscious sub'jects to ha va the same organs and nervous system 
for the same emotions to produce the same signa. What is impor-
tant is how they use their bodies, the simultaneous patterning 
of body and world in emotion.'lf19 Both body and world undergo a 
patterning in the symbolic expression. Since neither are static, 
the world does not dictate to the body what sign (natural) it 
must use; nor does the body artificially pattern his environment 
by his sign. The artificial-natural distinction must be surpassed. 
This is true for a smile and it is true for a word. ~It is no 
more natural, and no less conventional, to shout in anger or to 
19p.p., 220. "II ne 8uftit pas que deux suJets conscients 
alent les m'mes organes at Ie meme systeme nerveux pour que 
leB memes emotions se donnent chez taus deux lea memes signes. 
C. qui importe c'est la maniere dont ils font usage de leur 
lcor
ps , c'est la mise en forme simultanie de leur corps et de 
eUr monde dans l'emotion.~ 
kiss in love than to call a table a 'table.,"20 Verbal speech is 
merely one particular case of human behavior in ''''hich there is a 
simultaneous patterning of bodily statos and environmontal 
institutions. Nev~'rtheloss it is n pr1 vilegt1d case beeF.lUee it 
provides the opportunity to Include itsolf tn its syrnboliz8tions. 
One can speak about speech as one cannot paint a:bOut pa inting. 
Speech, especially philosophic speech, provides the wherewithal 
for catching hold of all specific modes of human l:'eha.vior 
including itself. 
Up to this point the communicative aspect of language has 
been neglected. Merleau-Ponty treats this aspect throughout his 
essay. For to speak is to speak to someone. A fuller treatment 
of the problem of communication will be taken up in the next 
chapter. The communal situation is mentioned here so far as it 
reveals human existence. 
If to speak a language is to pattern a world, neverthe-
less this 1'~ot done in any solipsistic way. For language has a 
social aspect (langue) which is formed by the inter-action of 
individuals speaking together (parole). The world, therefore, 
takes shape among speakers. In one sense it is glven to a 
person at birth; for he is born into a certain culture of a 
certain language. And, while plunged into this context. he, by 
his own activity, aids in the formation and development of that 
Culture and language. We might speak of the one American 
20p .p •• 220. "II ntest pas plus naturel ou pas moins 
~~nyentionner de crier dane la colere ou d'embraBser dans 
au10ur que d'appeler table une table.~ 
language as it is contained in '~Jebster' s Sixth Internati onal 
Dictionary. But George's American lan6uage is different from 
Harry's. And when they communicate each has & style \~11ich is 
unique and incorumunicable. Though humc.n existence if.> -~o express, 
ther-e Is no one absolut e human exL~tcnce. E.aeh exi.l;,tencE. is 
l":C:lrsvnal and uniquv. And each exiEttenc6 is intimately connected 
with the existence of the other. 
At this point a summary may help unify ~~e above points 
selected froru Marleau-Ponty's philosophy. Merleau-Ponty begins 
wi th the \<.rid.est possible context of organic behavior. He dis-
covers it to bE the organism coming to terms with its environment, 
not piecemeal, but through the foruation of bebavioral and per-
ceptual forms of Gestalten. Now within this wide concept of 
behavior, be distinguishes out humsn. behavior. ':lhat is charac-
teristic of the behavior or the human organism is that it 
exercises a certain initi~tive and creativity in the formation of 
the b~h&vioral and perceptual fonus. Man is able to objectify 
and consciously develop these forms. Such a form, creatively 
controlled and objectified, 1s a symbOl. Therefore human 
behavior is distinguished by its symbolic character. Nevertheless 
this behavior is organic or bodily. It is an organism. coming to 
terms with or in dialogue with the environment in this lllnique, 
symbolic fashion. Through this act the world is rormed--the 
enVironment symbolically present. By this act man is constituted 
a man. For this is the behavior that defines man: To exist, to 
be and act human, is to express, symbolize, utter the word. This 
--
essential givenness to the world. It is exist~. An organism 
becomes a human body in expression. It is Eresence. In this 
act the world becomes present to man and man is present to the 
world. Both man and w'orld become into being through this act of 
posi ting the symbol. This Bct is not a secondary act of man. It 
does not follow a more basic act of thinking or conceivlng. The 
actoi' positing the symbol and symbolically forming Cl world 
constitutes man's knowledge or perception of the world. But here 
again contrary to intellectualism it must be insisted that these 
symbolic patterns are not the product of the individual mind 
(Kant). They are progressively developed through the inter-action 
of many speakers and the world. 
i~lerleau-Ponty has moved in upon. corporal intentionality 
or the body as a dynamism to the world. Now he focuses upon 
the bodily act of expression in the language act. He finds it a 
unity of two components. These two components are evident in 
the word "expression" which means the word-expressed or the 
expressing-act or both. This ambiguity founds the distinction 
between the langue, the product t and earole, the act. Both are 
needed to explain language; one cannot be without the other. 
For the langue is found at the intersection of many paroles: 
The common world is formed in the context of many individual 
speaking-acts in communication. 
The language theory advanced by Merleau-Ponty best fi ts the 
data provided by the study of aphasia. Aphasiacs, by losing the 
pO"'Imr to speak creatively, have lost the. power to orientate 
th u eves towards the world. or 
--
control the things of th e world. In a sense, they have no ".,orld, 
but J rather, complex sense experi ences of an indi. vidua 1 singular 
character which can be reacted to di.f'f'''rently but ~\'h:t.ch &!'e 
not connected with each other is a systematic unit. 2l These 
pa.tients are sick; they have lO:5t the essential humnn character-
istiC. An analysis of them proves thfl.t the speaking-net is a 
mode of human existence. As soon as man uses language to 
establish a living relation with himself or with his fellol['s, 
langUAge is nc longer an instrument, no longer 3 means; it is a 
manifestation, a revelation of intixate bein~ and of the psychic 
link ~rlhich unites us to tl'1.e world and our fellow men. ,,22 And 
Goldstein, after his analysis cf aphasia, writes: "Language i8 
an expression of ~an's very nature ~nd his basic cap~city. It 
is an expression of his symbolic power.,,2) 
In this chapter the language act was inspected more from 
the side of body tha.n from th e side of world; the Earole was 
stressed over the lan&Re. The COllllllon world and the proble:n of 
communication is the subject of the next chapter. 
APPENDIX: Three Dichotomies 
In his analysis of the language-act, Marleau-Ponty has 
21Goldstein, 2e. 
2)Goldstein 40. 
offered his readers a philosophy of man and a philosophy of 
knowledge. Moreover, it seems to this writer that Merleau-Ponty 
is resolving three classic dichotomies by his theory. In a 
brief but rather systematic presentation of the resolution of 
these dichotomies, his philosophy'of man and knowledge will be 
further revealed. The ~h~ee dichotomies are sense-perception 
and intellection, subject and object,and action and cognition. 
By affirming perception to be bodily expression, Merleau-
Ponty surpasses and synthesizes the antitheses of sensation and 
intellection. 
The empiricist stresses the sensory aspect of knowledge. 
He claims that the known is made up of a collection of the basic 
sense units. Pure sensation is the experience of an undiffer-
entiated impact or an instantaneous atom ot feeling. But this 
theory corresponds to nothing in experience. Mo area of pure 
impressions can be found. Gestalt psychology is insistent upon 
this point. It indicates the figure-ground context of all sensa-
tion. One senses a whole upon a background which enters into the 
delineation of that whole. The Tfelementary" perception is already 
charged with meaning. "When Gestalt theory informs us that a 
figure on a background is the 'Simplest sense-datum available to 
us, we reply that this is not a contingent characteristic of 
factual perception, which leaves us free, in an ideal analysis, 
to bring in the notion of impressions. It is the very definition 
of the phenomenon of perception, that without which a phenomenon 
cannot be said to be a perception at all. When one leaves the 
traditional theories to re-examine the fact of perception, he 
finds no isolable elements of sensation; "pure sensation" is a 
fantasy. One senses objects or configurations, not atomic 
impressions. To see is to encounter colors; to hear is to 
encounter sounds. And in order to understand sensation, is it not 
enough to have seen the color red and to have heard middle C? 
"But red or green are not sensations, but sense-data; and 
quality is not an element of consciousness but a property of the 
object. n25 The theory that we perceive pure qualities which 
set limits to pure sensations is not based on the testimony of 
consciousness but on a widely held prejudice. "'~e think we know 
perfectly well what 'seeing,' 'hearing,' 'feeling,' are, because 
perception has long provided us wi th objects which are colored 
or emit sounds. When we try to analyze it, we transpose these 
objects into consciousness. We commit what psychologists call 
'the experienc~ error,' which means that we we know to be 
things in themselves we immediately take as being in our cons-
ciousness of them. 26 By making perception out of things per-
ceived and by making qualities elements of conSCiousness, we 
find isolable, unintelligible, and uncommunicable atoms of 
sensation. But against this theory is urged a re-examination of 
24 f·f· , 10. 
2'1:.1:. , 10. 
26p.p., 11. 
--
the fact of perception. Here is not found a pure sensation apart 
from some delineation of objects. Rather our involvement in the 
world is re-discovered •. "We are involved in the world and we do 
not succeed in extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve 
consciousness of the world. If we did we should see that all 
consciousness is consciqllsness of something."27 This is not to 
say that the "something~ for consciousness is completely deter-
mined, delineated, and identified in perception. There is an 
ambiguity! in our everyday contact with objects in the world. 
But despite this ambiguity there isalready a "meaning" in 
the most basic sensation no matter how ambiguous this meaning is. 
It has a place in the world, a shape, an orientation, and a 
relation to the perceiver. 
~nile the empiricist begins with the isolated blocks ot 
sensation, the intellectualist stresses the understanding in the 
acts o.f a, ttenti on and judgment. He asserts tha t, since in 
at tenti on one experiences the elucidation ot the object, the 
perceived object must already contain the intelligible structure 
which it reveals. "It cons~1 ousness finds a geometric circle 
in the circular fOTrrl of a plate, it is because it had already 
put the circle there. For it gave possession of the knowledge 
brought by attention. It is enough for it to come to itself 
again in the sense in which a man is said to come to himself 
27.E.,f., If.. "Nous sommes pris dans Ie I~nde at nous 
n'arrivons pas a nous en detacher pour passer a Is conscience 
du monde. Si nous Ie faisions, nous verrions que la qualite 
n'est jamais eprouvee immediatement etiue toute conscience 
est conscience de quelque chose." 
again f.~rter fainting. "28 The mind has a definite structure 
which imposes itself upon the object encountered to make it 
intelligible. One need only notice in the object the structure 
which has already been received by its confrontation with mind. 
But in e consciousness ~nidh eternally possesses the 
intelligible structure of all its objects, attention remains 
an ineffectual pO\'1er; it bes no work to perform. The vmrk bas 
all been done by the initial confrontation. "How could an 
object, distinguished by its presence, call forth an act of 
attention, since consciousness includes all objects?~29 
Consciousness for the empiricist is too poor; for the 
intallectu~dist it is too rich. Both have the idea in common 
that Attention creates nothing, since a world of impressions or 
Ii universe of determining thoui,ht are equally independent of the 
action of the mind. 30 Psychology affirms against both that per-
caption is a development of categories. Perceptory forms are 
developed in time !l.S the organism attErupts to cdapt itself to the 
world and the world to itself. They are not the ready-made 
products of mind forced upon clatt#cr. Nor are they caused by the 
world in an impressionable, wax-tablet mind. They are evolved 
through the inter-action of organism and environment. 
When intellectualism appeals to judgment, it does so as a 
second a ct. Judgment follows upon a sensation which is a little 
different than th e empiricist t s "sensation." Judgment is 
30p .1:., 36-37. 
29 P.P., 
- -
36. 
introduced to proVide what is lacking in sensation to mak.e per-
ception possible.31 Both empiricists and intellectualists err 
in so far as they take the objective world as their object of 
analysis when this comes first neither in time nor in virtue of 
its meaning. Both are incapable of expressing the peculiar way 
in which perceptual consciousness constitutes its object, 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, attempts to catch the act of 
primary perception, which is the act of objectifying, before it 
has been objectified. It does not begin in the world already 
made or structured, but in the act through which the world is 
structured. From this vantage point, the world while becoming 
and being meaningful is not absolutely categorized. It is not 
clear cut; it is ambiguous because of the ambiguity of the per-
ceptive act itself. 
Phenomenology synthesizes empiricism and idealism by with-
drawing to a new basis--the basic act of perception where the 
world is not prior to mind nor is mind prior to world. This is 
the basis upon which both mind and world rest and take meaning. 
This act lies between mind and world, so to speak, constituting 
them both. Perception is a bodily act in which the human 
organism is present to its world through the gradual formation of 
structures. Perception is not without meaning (pure sensation) 
since it takes place only through these forms. These forms are 
not static or absolute since they are constantly being developed. 
They are not caused by a fixed brute nature; nor are they 
31 f.f •• 40. 
arbi trari1.y forced upon the world by a constituting consciousness. 
They are worked out "between" the world and the organism. In 
man these forms are symbolic. Words, paintings, and religious 
ritual are instances of the human organism symbolically 
patterning his world. And it is through these patterns and cate-
gories that he percei ves. 
As sensation and intellection are synthesized in the 
symbolic act of perception, empiriCism and intellectualism are 
synthesized in phenomenology. 
Here too are found all the conditions to surpass the tra-
ditional subject-object dichotomy. The object, .!.!! lli, and the 
subject, pour soi, are synthesized in existence. 32 For the 
materialist and the idealist there is no middle ground between 
the for-itself and the in-itself. Both find a pure consciousness 
confronting brute matter. The materialist asserts the priority 
of matter: Mind has evolved from matter and is causally deter-
mined by matter. The idealist asserts the priority of mind 
which has eternally structure1 matter by its initial confronta-
tion. Mind contains matter; material things are elements of 
consciousness. The phenomenological notion of existence sur-
passes the noti on of pure consciousness and brute matter. Exis-
ter.ce is the objectifying and subjectifying act of man. This is 
the basic act of the human organism in which a world is being 
321Itlerleau-Ponty's relationship ':Ii th JEan Paul Sf1rtre could 
be the subject of another chapter. For in many respects Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy is a re6pon3e to Sartre's. We merely mention 
here that Merleau-Ponty is vigorously reacting against the 
dualistic ensci aour ~ metaphysics of Sartre and his notion 
of absolute ree om. 
formed and the organism become~ conscious of itself at the 5a~e 
time. In objectifying, a subject appears to himself as a subject. 
In this one act both subject lind object become; thay are 
inseparable but distinct. Bec;.:.use Goldst.Ein's patients h;-,d lest 
the power to objectify, thtly '.:erE! tot.ally irrnr.ersed in thoir en-
vironment. There ~~s no distinction for them between suhject and 
object.)) The idealist's prima.cy of consciousntass and the 
materialist's primacy of nature give way to the prima.cy of exis-
tence, the etre-~-monde. 
,. 
Another 'May of demonstrating the fact of the ~-!.:!:!-monde 
ie by indicating a dual priority and a dual determination. Per-
cGption, it has beon noted, is neither the product of conscious-
ness nor the product ot nature. It is the product of both as the 
human organism come s to terms with hi S :tlorld. A polf,ri ty is 
discovered. The act can be seen travelling in one dir~ction, 
nature to :nind, or in another. mind to naturG. But it should be 
remembered that this is an a[r;.biguous act. It is, as it Tilera, an 
8.ct travelling two directioD.S at th~ sa.i.:G time. As such it gives 
being to and is the ground of its polarities. And since exis-
tence is the act that constitutes man, he is n~lth.er 
consciousness, pour !.2!., or object, !im. m. He is a synthesi 5 
of the two. 
The third classical dichoto:ny M.arleau-Ponty surpasses is 
that between the practical and the speculative, doing and 
kno'rling. praxiS and theorin. It seems at t he outset that 
33Goldstein, )6. 
Merleau-Ponty aligns himself with the philosophies of praxis. He 
begins in a context of organic behavior as it is defined by 
biology and psychology. He condemns the epistemological philos-
ophies of empi'ricism and intellectualism. He affirms the 
primacy of existence over essence, of the lived-world over the 
cognitive-world. He insists upon the necessity to leave the 
categories of reflection and re-discover the pre-cognitive, pre-
J\ 
reflective etra-au-monde. 
- ........ .;..;;..;; .... 
On the other hand, it seems that Marleau-Ponty is prima.rily 
interested in epistemology. Hi.s subject is perception. He 
places himself 'Iii thin th e ampiri ci st-intellectualist controversy. 
He de::nonstrates tha.t man' 5 basic behavior is symbolic and there-
fore cognitive. He ealls his liv(~d-experience a. kind of 
knowledge. 
There is s.mbiguity because Merleau-Ponty he,s plaeed himself 
at the point where praxis and theoria meet, 'Nhere existence is the 
act of percepti on, where bodily intenti ona11 ty is bodily expres-
sion. In his analysis of th e body, he found that the body is 
not something that is put into act. Of its nature it is active. 
Te be what it is. it is expressing itself to a 1t,orld. This aet 
of bodily expression is fundamErltaJ to all specific acts of 
work, of love, of speech. Symbolic behavior is the bodily 
expression that sets things apart from the self and the self 
from them. HUlllan beh.3.v1or (praxis) is the act of presence 
;:.theorie) to self and to things. In this it/ay even '",ork and 
love qnd speech are cognitive actiVities; they Are modes of 
being present tQ the worJd and of organizing it. The different 
nbehaviors" of man such as sCience, art. religion, common sense 
and their corresponding worlds can be understood only in terms 
of this founding behavior (intentionalite oEerante !1 corporelle) 
which is the b:::tsic structure of the human organism. In the next 
chapter we shall see how this is so. 
CHAPTli,R III 
LANGUAGE AND THE SOCIAL WORLD 
Chapter two \dtnessed the phenomenology of speech accuse 
and convict the traditional prejudices of empiricism and intel-
lectualism. Atainst erupirici am it, was proved that speech does 
not consist in verbal images corresponding to stimuli from the 
outside world. Psychology has d.emonstrated that the or~,anism is 
active in its organization of the world through the formation of 
categories. Lang~age presupposes a specific attitude on the part 
of the organism. Against intellectualism it was proved that 
words etre not merely the carriers or shells of pre-established 
meaning; if this were so, speech would not be necessary to 
thought. To overcome these traditional prejudices it was neces-
sary for phenomenology to catch language in the act. It does not 
begin with words havlng-been-uttered or wi th the world <.1.1ready 
formeci. It re-presents the act of speaking as it j. s Ii ved. 
Phenomenology re-presents the body as expressing itself to the 
\'lOrld through a gesture. My body and the consciousness I hu. ve of 
it (without thematizing it) is immediately significative of a 
certain landscape around me. l My pC! role is pregnant with the 
lp.p. t 216-217. "C'ast par mon corps que je comprends aut-
l'ui, comma c' est par mon corps que je per~oi~ des f choses.' Le 
sens du geste aiai 'compris' nfest pas derriere lui, i1 se confond 
avec 1a structure du monde que Ie geste dessine at que je reprends 
a mon co~pte •••• " ~g 
signification surrounding it. It is ~ style of singing the 
worlci. It includes my voice, my inflection, the text leAding up 
a.nd away frora it. l!;xpressing is not a m.ere fiElttl?r' of \oI:riting 
down id~:,&s that ruight be lOf;'t. It is bringin€:: into exist(l}"lcE'; it 
is oiH:!ning, a new field in E::xperi~nce. It Clh;;dlat8s my L1ute 
intontion and my ".'lords so the. t illy Nerds surprise me and evon tell 
me ray t.hougtl ts. 2 
~yords do not contain Il'lea.."'lings, they ~ meanine;s. Tho 
meaninr,s of' \'jords are like the Kantian limiting concepts. They 
are the convergence of l~ny acts of expression. 3 1;1hen tho 
autnor sits down to write his book, he is noti sure ".here he ~'Wi.ll 
be led. He has, hO'wover, the directions of p;~st ()cts of eXl')rae-
sion wnich iire beginning to converge. Th·ase converge and the 
convergEmce is grasped in expressi on, th e unifi ad book. This is 
why expression is never complete. It is alws"ys leadi nf beyond 
itself. It demands integ,ra tion into anot hf'r speaking ~.ct.. 
Lang.sge is not. static, a. once and for all utterance. It is ~, 
continual process of converging upon meaning. 
The phenomenology of !; pe ech demonE) tr<ited that tholl€ht s do 
not exist befor'e expression. They ere constituteo in the axpres-
sive act. The expressive act is not a second operation of the 
2pip:np,s, 111. "11 Y a une sitnification 'langagiere t du 
lungag,e qui c c cOiupli t le. 111eui::, ti on ,e:ntl'O ItAOn i"ten tl on encore 
muette at les mots, de telle sorte que mes paroles me suprennent 
i At' . t ~ ~ IliO -iueme H I'll' enSe~gnen ma p~nsee. 
:~lgnes, 112. :lLes sig!lifl cations de 1a p!:~ ro Ie SOT'!t toujours 
des idees au sens kantien t les poles d'un certain nombre d'actes 
d' expr,)ssion convergent s qui ailllantent 1e discours sans ~tre 
proprement donnes pour leur compte." 
with a different intention. There are many \~ys of singing the 
world: the Japanese way, the American way, the Hopi Indian way. 
Who is to say which is ~ way? And in what language will he 
say it? For each unique expressive act there is another world. 
An individual lives in many worlds, but never two at once. There 
are not only Japanese and Indian worlds; there are the worlds of 
art, science, of religion, of common sense, of philosophy. 
There is my world as opposed to your world. And since language 
originates in the personal parole, no language is totally trans-
latable. 6 One cannot be reduced to the others. There is no one 
universal perfect language, as logical positivism assumed but 
failed to find. Each language is another "language game"; the 
individual makes up the rules as he goes. 7 
Merleau-Ponty has, therefore, confronted his reader with 
the fact of the incommunicability of language. It is due to the 
personal character of language. He has uncovered the facts of 
cultural and linguistic relativ.Lt¥. "It is not enough for two 
conscious subjects to ha. ve the same organs and nervous systems 
6f.~., 21g. "La predominance de~ voyelles dans una langue, 
des consonnes dans une autre, les systEmleS de construction et de 
syntaxe ne representeraient pas autant de conventions arbitraires 
pour exprimer la meme pensee, mais plusieurs manisres pour Ie 
corps humain de celebrer le monde et finalement de la vivre. De 
18 viandrait que le sens PleiN d'une langue n'est jamais 
traduisible dans une autre. ous pouvons parler plusieurs 
langues, mais l'una d'elle reste toujours celIe dans la '{luelle 
nous vivons. 
70ne could easily unite the langunge philosophy of Merleau-
Ponty with that of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Cf. Wittgenstein's 
theory of language-groues in Philosokhical Investifations, trans-
lated by G. E. M. Anscombe, New Yor: Macmillan 1953), #65 
~ passim. 
for the saHle eruoti ons to produce in both th e same signs. ';'lha t 
is important is how they use their bodies, the simultaneous 
pf1tterning of body and world. • • Feelings and personal conduct 
are invr:mted like words. Even those which t like paternity, seem 
to belong to the human make-up are in reality institutions.~g It 
is impossible to superimpose on man a lower layer of behavior 
which one chooses to call 'natural,' followed by a manufactured 
cultural or spiritual world •••• Behavior creates meanings 
which are transcendent in relation to the anatomical apparDtu8, 
and yet immanent to the behavior as such, since it communicates 
itself and is understood. It is irl1possible to draw up an 
inventory of this irrational power which creates meanings and 
conveys them. Speech is merely one particular case of it.,.9 
By these words f\ferleau-Ponty assents to Melville 
Herskovitz's principle of cultural relativitymd to Benjamin 
Whorf's principle of linguistic relativity. Herskovitz 
8f,.f. A 220. "II ne suffi~ pas qU,e deux sujets conscients 
aient les memes organes et Ie merne systeme nerveux pour que les 
memes emotions se donnent chez tous deux les memes signes. Ce 
qui importe c'est la maniere dont ils font usage de leur corps, 
c' est la mise en forme sil!.ultunee de leur corps et de leur raonde 
dans l' emotion ••• 105 sentiments de les conduites passionnelles 
sont inventes comrne les mots. .ileme ceux qui, comma la eaternite, 
paraissent inscrits dans Ie corps humain sont en realite des 
institutions." 
9p. p ., 220-221. "11 est impossible de superposer chez 
l'homme-line premiere couche de comporte:nents que l'on appellerait 
'naturals' et un monde culturel out spirituel fabrique •••• Les 
cOlllportements creent des significations qui sont transcandantes a 
1 t egard du disposi tif anatomique, et pourtant imrr!anents au compor-
te:f'rnt comme, tel puisqu'il s'ensignE~ et se comprend. On ne l(eut 
paS faire l'economia de cetta puissance irrHtionnelle qui cree de:s 
sigr...i fi cati ons et qui les comrrmnique. La pa role n' en est c;u 'un 
ca s pa rti culle r • " 
demonstrates tha t moral judr;neT'lts and language differ from cuJ-
ture to cult.ure. The evalub.tion of hu.'Uan (:I.cti vi ty is relative 
to tim'O:! und place. It is impossihle for anthropologt~ts ,':end 
moraliet>3 to evaluate and classify the valu.es of different cul-
tures. For such evaluations "stnnd or fall wi th thH accep1iunce 
of th e prer..1ises from ;,bich th ey derive. fTlO Cultural rel.ati vism 
must be employed as a method and a phi losophy to approGch values 
in culture. Its prinei pIe is: "Judgments ~re based on experi-
enc~ t and experience is interpreted by each indi vidual in t ')rm8 
of his own eneulturation. ,,11 Such a prl nei. pIe combats ethno-
c(~ntrism 'Nhich puts onetg own. way of life above all others. To 
neutraliz e hi.s own ,~t.hn·:>centrism and Cl.saure 3. mGaaure of objec-
ti vi ty for h:l.s sci\~nce, the 3nthropologi ~:lt must ent er into the 
different cult,ures and evalue,te them fron within (3 ccording to 
thei.r ovm standtlrds. 
Cultural relativism is obviously a co!"o11ary to linguistic 
relativism. In fact Herskovitz cites Ernst Cassirer who holds 
that re!J.lity can only be attained through symbolism or language 
and is therefor defined and redefined by the "ever-varied 
syt:loolism of the innumerable languages of ;nankind. ,,12 Benjamin 
v.Jhorf is one of the chief eXpOnHrlts of 1 inguistic relat! vi ty. He 
roj ects the intel1 ectua1ist belief tha t the cognitive processes 
lO:v131ville J. Herskovitz, Cultural AnthroEology, New York 
(1955), 348. 
ll~., p. 351. 
12Ibid. 
of all men possess a common logical structure operating inde-
pendently of communication. Rather, linguistic patterns 
determine what the individual perceives and thinks in the world. 
Percepti on is not the same for all indi viduals. Men through 
their varied and unique expressive activities are form.ing varied 
and unique worlds. What is being perceived depends on ,.mat is 
being expressed~ And this depends on the personal act of expres-
sion. I3 
Whorf compares American Itndian language wi th Indo-European 
langua ge to make some startling discoveries. In the Indo-
European languages substantives, adjectives, and verbs are l-,asic 
grammatical units. This scheme of a persisting entity under 
changing properties undergoing active and passive behavior is 
fund amen tal to th e I~do-European w~y of thinking. The universe 
becomes structure according; to the Aristotelian ca.tegories of 
substance and accident, matter and form. These structures lead 
to a physics of matter and force, mass and energy_ But American 
Indians whose langua.ge is not made up of subjects and adjecti ves 
structm'e the worl d di fferantly. "A Hopi t Chinese or Eskimo 
Einstein might discover via. hi s gramrnntical habits wholly differ-
ent math~,Hdtical conceptualizations with \..n-lich to 8Pperc:eive 
reo.lity_"l£,. 'iihorf goes so far as to say that "Newtonian space, 
time and matter are not intuitions. They are recepts from 
culture and language."15 
l3Cf. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, ~An Essay on the Relativity 
of Categories," ph~losophy.2! Science XXII (1955), pp. 243-263. 
14Ibid., 246. 15Ibid ., 245. 
Benjamin Whorf and Melville Herskovitz have been 
'subpoenaed in order to provide linguistic and anthropological 
evidence to Merleau-Ponty's judgment against the natural sign 
theory. They also underline the problem arising out of that 
judgment. If there are no standard, immutable categories of 
the mind prior to linguistic activity and if, on the other hand, 
Itnature" does not dictate an absolute verbal and perceptory 
response, where is the standard for communication. Upon What 
basis does a symbolic systeru rest. 
Merleau-Ponty assures us that this baSis is not another 
symbolic systED common to all symbolic systems. 16 The turn of 
the century witnessed the search for such a "perfect language" 
in England among the logical atomists and on the continent in 
the Vienna Circle. Many model systems of logic were discovered. 
Each was valic'l and consistent. Each formalism rested on a 
number of ax ions composed of undefined terms; each developed 
according to an undefined rule. To justify the axioms and rules 
it is necessary to make them theorems of another systEm which in 
turn rests upon axioms and undefined rules. A search to 
formally justLt,r all postulates and thus establish a perfect 
l6si~nest 112. II y a donc toujours du sous-entendu 
dans l'axpres5ion,--ou plutot la notion de sous-entendu est a 
rejeter: elle n' a un s ens que si nous premons pour modele at 
pour absolu de l'expression une langue (d'ordinaire la notre) qui, 
en fait, cormn8 tout es les aut res , ne peut jamais nous conduire 
'comme par la IIlain t jusqu' a la signification, jUS~lU' aux choses 
memes. Ne diecns done pas que toute expression est imparfait 
parce qu'elle sous-entend, disons que toute expression est par-
faite dans la nesure ou elle est comprise sans eQuivoque et 
admettons eomrne fait fondaruental de l' expression un depassement du 
signifiant par Ie sig,nifie:jue c' est la vertu meme du sI,.gnifiant 
_de rendre Dos!Bible. n 
language involves one in an infinite series. This, of course, 
conforms to Godels proof: The justification of a system does 
not rest in its formalism or object-language; one must have 
recour~e to the meta-language. The point Godel makes in his 
distinction between object-language and meta-language is the 
same 2tlerleau-Ponty makes in his lan€,Ue-parole distinction. The 
langue which is the objective symbolic system can be understood 
only within the non-verbalized context of the speaking act in a 
situation. 
It is time to clarify the problem of communication. The 
question is not "Is communication possible?" It is 'tHow is 
communication possible?" If there are many languages and many 
symbolic worlds, on what basis d.oes communication rest? Merleau-
Ponty never questioned the fact of communication. But how does 
it take place? Although Herskovitz and Whorf pointed out many 
different symbolic systems and worlds t still they 't/ere able to 
enter them and communicate in them; otherwise they could not tell 
their readers about these worlds. Merleau-Ponty states that a 
language is not totally translatable. Still one can speak 
several languages. He can enter into the world a different 
language expresses and make it his own. Given the relativity ot 
language, how can this be? 
It must be remembered that Merleau-Ponty not only re-
jected natural signs. He rejected artificial signs as well. 
Although a response 1s not dictated. to 8.t'"1 organism from outside 
causes in nature, still organic patterning, including the 
Not all 
determination comes from the individual person. The person is 
found and formed in a particular context. He does not cre:ate a 
language; he is born into one. Though he can exercise a cprtain 
personal creativ.t ty in the development of that language, still he 
is limited in that he begins \'lith cE'rtain given language patterns 
and must deal with certain patterns in others. There is a ten-
sion between personal creativity and the context of tradition; 
one cannot be without the other. It is only within a context of 
a language system with its roots in the past that an individual 
is able to develop and change that system. The develop:nent takes 
place through the individuals peaking to the other. In communica-
tion he is adapting his hearer to his own perceptory patterns 
and adapting himself to the patterns of the other sp~akers. 
To understand the incommunicability of language one must 
begin with the fact of communication. Communication implies 
cotmr4union. To understand the langue of another person I must 
live his parole. Therefore, the basis for communication is not 
in the formalism of a language (langue), but in the speaking-act 
(parole) inter-acting with other speaking-acts. Merleau-Ponty 
inquires into the conditions of possibility of this inter-action 
in his examina tion of the "aoc! al world." 
The Social World 
"I am thrown into a nature," immersed in a world of 
objects. 17 I cannot think away the '1.r(orld without also thinking 
17 8 f..f.., 39 • 
-away .nyself. I am an intention to objects. While I percei ve, 
even though I do not h~-.l. ve knowledge of the organic conditions of 
my pArceptlnn, I am al\fare of dra~"iing tog.ether dispersed 
"consciousnesses": sigp.t, hearing, touch, and their fields are 
anterior to and other than my personal life. nThe 1'18 tura 1 object 
is the track left by this generalized existence. And every 
object will be firstly and in some respect a natural object made 
up of colors, tactile and s.udi tory qualities is so far a s it is 
destined to enter my life. 18 But I do not find myself living 
only in the midst of water, and earth, and fire, I find myself 
also linked with roads, villages, streets, churches, tools, a 
bell, a pipe. I am surrounded by cultural objects. Each is 
linked to the human action Which it serves. 19 These cultural 
objects are things encountered through my sensory and perceptory 
patterns. Yet they are things that point to subjects. In these 
cultural objects I feel the presence of others. Someone made 
the pipe and used it for smoking. And it is only through the 
percepti on of th e human act and another person that the percep-
tion of a cultural world could be verified,20 But how can such 
an act be grasped? Is it deduced from these cultural objects 
using the principle of analogy? The body of another is the 
cultural obj ect .E!!: excellence on which all other cultura.1 
ob.1ects depend. Do I encounter tt as a thing among things until 
I realize my own body and argue to the existence of another 
within that body? But then the body rema.ins an ob,ject for me. 
20 P .,E., 400. 
And I am l03t in thE' solipsism of empiricist and intellectualist 
thcught. Perhaps I can in some \~ay Ii va the t)th~r' 8 body ':=1.5 I 
liV~J .:ny own. He uses his body to express an ;.ntention, a thought, 
a project. "But how can an object in space become the eloquent 
relic of an existence? ••• How, conversely, can an intention, a 
thought, a project detach themselves from the personal subject 
and become visible outside him in the sha.pe of his body and in 
the environment which he builds for himself?" These are the 
philosophical problems raised by the realization of the cultural 
1...,orld~ Rephrased, the qUAstion is: How can B. corporal intentiona-
lity, the body as expression, meet and communicate with another 
and so enter his world? 
The existen ce of other people is a stumbling block for 
objecti visti.c thoue:ht, empiricist and intellectualist. For 
objectivistic thou~t begins with the world as totally objective. 
The body is the object biology talks about. HThe body of 
another, like my own, is not inhabited (for objective thought), 
but is an object standing for the consciousness which thinks 
21 or constitutes it." There are only two modes of being: being-
in-itself which is the object arrayed in space and being-for-
itself which is consciousness. Another person would stand before 
me ~8 an in-itself and YAt seero to exist for-himself. This in-
vol v.,s me in a contradictory operati on. I ha va to distinguish 
him from myself and so place him in the world of objects; and 
yet I M ve to think of him as a consci.ousness to \f.hich I ha ve 
21p P 401. . ., 
- -
access ~erely because that is my own being. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, there is no place for other people or tor a plurality 
of consciousness in objectivistic thought. In so far as I 
constitute the world, I cannot conceive another consciousness. 
For this other consciousness \t.Ould ha va to be conet! tutlng the 
world and I \!Ould not be the constituting agent. Even if I 
succeeded in thinking or the consciousness as constituting the 
world, it would be I Who would be constituting it as such; and 
once more I should be the sole constituting agent. 22 
But Merleau-Ponty has already accused and convicted 
objectivistic thought. The evidence he used was an experience 
of the body and world which does not conform with the empiricist 
and the intellectualist theories. Body and world are no longer 
objects co-ordinated by the functional relationships that 
physics establishee. The body 1s not £l the objective world but 
is a movement to the world. "At the same time as the body 
withdraws trom the objective world and forms between t he pure 
subject and the object a third genus or being, the subject loses 
its purity and its transparency."23 There 1s no pure subject or 
absolutely separated object. The misconception ot a pure 
subj act was not due to experience but to the abstract! ve, 
objectivistic attitUde of the scientific mind which is 80 given 
to the world ot objective relation thst it neglects its own Got 
so objective relation to that world. 
One must distinguish his own body and the body of his 
22f. • .e... 402. 
friend from the objective body discussed in physiology class. 
One does not experience consciousness as being something distinct 
from his body. It is his body in so far as it is being lived. 
With these clarified notions of consciousness and body, the 
contradictions arising out of objectivistic thought vanish. 
'When I turn to perception, passing from direct perception to 
thinking about perception, I re-enact it and find it work in 
my orga.ns of perception a thought older than myself of which 
those organs are merely a trace. n24 . That is, there is a 
primary experience of self in my very action of dealing with 
objects in the world. In like manner I understand the existence 
of another person. I re-enact his existence to understand him. 
This is not analogy. The other consciousness would be deduced 
only if the emotional expressions of the other are compared 
with mine and if precise COlTelations are recognized my 
physical behavior and "psychic events." But the perception of 
others is anterior to, and is the condition of, such objective 
observations. The observations do not constitute the perception. 
Just as live my own existence and then account for it in 
philosophy; so ,I first live another's existence before r give 
any philosophies.1 a ccount. I live with another his pattern of 
behavior ~~d perception; in this way I have lived, not deduced, 
knowledge of his existence. If I take the finger of a fifteen 
month old baby between my teeth and pretend to bite it, the 
child opens his mouth. Though he has never seen his mouth or 
teeth, he knows them from the inside as an apparatus to bite 
with. And my jaw is immediately for the baby capable of the 
same intentions. He perceives my intention as his own body. 
rtBetween my consciousness and my body as I experience it, between 
the phenomenal body of mine and that of another as I see it from 
the outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the 
other to appear as the completion of the system."25 If I am 
totally a subject then I cannot grasp the other as one. But 
since I am neither pure subject nor object, my body is never 
totally an object for the other nor his for me. 
In so far as I have sensory functions and in 80 far as 
I am surrounded by a perceptory field, I am already in communi-
cation with others. As soon as my gaze falls upon a living body 
acting, the objects surrounding it take on a new significance. 
These objects are what this other pattern of behavior, as well 
as my own, is about to make of them. Already the other body has 
ceased to be a part of the world and has become a view of the 
world. Another person is manipulating my objects. I know this 
is so because this living body has the same structure as mine. 
"I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms 
of behavior and a certain world, and I am given to myself merely 
as a certain hold upon the world. Row it is precisely my body 
\~hich perceives the other's body and discovers in it a miraculous 
prolongation of my own intention, a !amiliar way of dealing with 
the world. n26 This other life is open. It relates itsel! to 
26p.p., 406. 
external objects by diverting them from their immediate signifi-
cance. It makes tools of them. It projects itself into the 
environment in the shape of cultural objects. The child is born 
into such an environment. He finds the cultural objocts, 
appropriates them, and learns to use them as others do "because 
the body image ensures the immediate correspondence of what he 
sees done and what he himself does."27 
Language is a cultural object that plays a crucial role 
in the perception of others. "In the experience of dialogue, 
there is constituted between the other and myself a common 
ground. My thought and his are interwoven into a single 
fabric ••• We have here a dual being, where the other is for me 
no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor 
I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate 
reclprocity."28 I have my own thoughts; he has his. Yet his 
objections bring out thoughts that I had no idea I possessed. I 
anticipate his thought because I am caugfit up in the directions 
of his thought. All the while I am not thinking about him, but 
about what is being said. Yet I am experiencing him, living out 
his act, undergoing his patterns of perception and behavior. 
The child has no Eroblem of other people. He is totally 
immersed in the activities of others until he is able to develop 
unique activities of h~s own. About the age of twelve, however, 
he reaches the age of reason, the level of judgment and the 
cogito. He discovers himself and others reflectively. The 
problem of the other arises with this knowledge. He begins to 
see the other as a possible danger to his own position and view-
point. 
The problem of the other is not only the result of objec-
tive thought. It can precede objective thought. For, though I 
can live the experience of the other to some extent, it is always 
a limited communion. I suffer with Paul the loss of his wife; 
but I have not lost my ~1fe. I can put on the patterns of 
another person's thought; but these ne~'er quite fit. I feel 
uncomfortable in his patterns. This causes me to object and to 
modify his thought; at the same time I am developing my own 
thought. He listens to ~e, puts on my patterns, finds them some-
what uncomfortable. And the dialogue continues. But the dialogue 
demands a certain willingness to co-exist. Each speaker must be 
willing to listen. Each must experience the reciprocity. 
However, in the dialogue I am aware of myself and my 
unique viewpoint. I assert myself absolutely. I become the 
sole criterion of truth. I transcend others. For every situation 
and every other person must be experienced by me in order to 
exist in my eyes. So the problem of the other is the problem of 
solipsism. 
And yet other people are a fact for me. I am present 
not merely with a problan of solipsism, but with the absurdity 
of a multiple solipsism. Solitude and communication are not two 
horn$ of a dilemma but two moments of one phenomenon. My 
experience must in some way present me with other people, else I 
should h& va no occasion t~) ~peak of solitude and could not 
pronO'lnce other people inaccessible. But how can I 'I'!ho pereei ve 
and who ipso facto assert mys elf as universal subject porcei ve 
another 'Hho i:nmedi<.l tely deprives me of thl s nnl vers,!:!l i ty. The 
phenoillanon at the root of my subjecti vi ty Rnd my tr;:mscendence 
consi3ts in lly beint, given to !!1yself. I am given; I find myself 
already involved in a physico-social world. I am given to 
myself ",ilieh means that tho situation is never hidden fro'u me. 
I am not just another object in a conta:i.n'3r. ~~y subjectivity 
depends on my throwness in the -world of thi ngs'lnd others. I 
can close my eyes to my world. I can, Cartesian-wise, ~:!uestion 
every perception. But even in this I am orientated to things 
and to others. ·tI can evol va a solipsist philosophy; but in 
doing so I assume the exist':lnce of a community of men endowed ,'11th 
speech, and I address myself to it. n29 Men are so surrounded 
by c o Ill1lunication tha t even the refusal to communicate is a form 
of it. When one objectifies the other to deny him by the stare 
(Sartre), he affirms both himself and the othAr in the flct. The 
transcendence of the other pe T'son l,,,h en I a ssert my own su.bjecti-
vity against his comes about only in an immanence ,dhere I gnter 
into his world and perception. "Solipsism would be strictly true 
only of SOlneone ..... no m8naged to be tacitly a,ware of his existence 
',dthout being or doing unything; which is impossible since 
29p • p ., 414. "Je peux constrire una P9ilosophie solipsiste, 
mais t en Ie 1aisant, je suppose unl~ communaute d 'hommes parlants 
et je m'adresse a elle." 
exL')tence is oetng in r.nd o.f the iiorld • • 130 
The social,.·or Id 18 l'8-di.sco,rerE:d, thprefore, not as a 
suw of objects, but as a permannnt fteld or dimension of exlstf'T)Ce. 
The relationship to thr:' Aocial \fiorld if' deeper than any (~XpreBB 
P8rC8l-,tion; 1 t is existence itself. Objecti V(~ thoucht ;nay neglect 
this fundamental principle; but it cannot h(~lp but to live it. 
The social \t.rorld is the context of Flll existence. It is already 
there before one CaMPS to know or judge it. The problem of com-
,nunication is resolved in the phe'!"}.omenolo~!1cp.l reallz.ation of the 
self as an orientation to the world, possi ble only becausp it is 
3. co-orientation. to things with others. ThIs triadic relation to 
oth ers, to s eli, e.nd to things cansti tutes the ~~lf. The basis 
of communication is the lived relation of self tn another self. 
Each self is experienced unique. Yet each i$ Axperienced as being 
stru cturally th e same: '" each is a unique !!!!-~-monde. 
Summary 
This is hoth a SUtlUll3 ry and an amplification of what has 
come before. It is hoped thRt the implications of the basis and 
principle of communication will be made explicit. 
The importance of l~lnf.'ljage has been outlined. The 
language act is reve1ativ€ of human existence. Human p.xistence 
30p .1:., 414. 'fLe solipsi~me ne serai t rigoureusement vrai 
que de querqu'un qui reussirait a constater tacitAment son exis-
tence sans etra rien et sans rien faire, ce qui est bien 
impossible, puisque exister c'est ~tre au mende. nans sa retraite 
reflexive, Ie philosophe n~ peut manquer d'entrainer les autres" 
parce que, dans l'obscurite du monde, i1 a appris pour toujours a 
les traiter comme consortes et que toute sa science est batie 
sur cette dQnnee de l' oDinion." 
is bodily expression to a world. The world is reached through 
symbolic activity. To understand human existence and the world 
which it informs, it is necessary to grasp expression, not as 
object, but as act. The act of expression is primary. The 
expressed can be understood only by viewing it within the act 
being spoken by the speaking-act. In this way the parole was 
stressed; the langue takes its meaning as it originates in the 
parole. This philosophy of language overcomes the traditional 
prejudices of objective thought which, neglecting its own 
parole, begins and ends in the langue. 
The basic ambiguity of the speaking-act came to light. 
Speaking is the act of objectifying or tending to objects in the 
world; it is a180 constitutive of the subject. Grasping the 
ambiguous nature of the speaking-act led to the rejection of 
the natural-artificial sign theory of objective thought. There 
is a dual determination. Man has a freedom and creativity over 
the formation of his symbolic worlds. And yet he is in a 
situation and cannot be arbitrary in his expression. He does 
not entirely make himself. He 1s given to himself. 
The individuality and ambiguity of the p!role opens 
the problem of communication. There are as many symbolic worlds 
as there are symbolic acts. Each world is irreducible to the 
other. There are the intranslatable worlds of the Japanese and 
the Hopi Indian, of science and art and religion and philosophy, 
of you and of me. The philosopher desires the unity of these 
worlds, he seeks a common world. For communication between 
wor 5 a fact. The Hopi Indian world cannot be translated 
into American; but the American can enter that world and appreci-
ate its difference. The basis for this communication is in the 
constant, yet open, structure of the symbolic act. This is 
what remains the same. This is what unites all men and all 
worlds. Nevertheless, how does communication take place? How is 
one expressive act in contact with another expressive act? How 
does one, so to speak, get inside another's parole so a8 to 
appreciate his langue? This is what Merleau-Ponty describes in 
his analysis of the social world. 
A child is not an original being. He is not the first in 
a series. He is not born out of silence into silence. He is 
conceived in the clearest and loveliest of human expressions. He 
is born into a world that is singing and laughing and calling his 
name.. He is born into a culture that has developed, as his body 
has developed, out of the past. He is immersed in the expres-
sions of that culture which have come from the past and which 
he is asked to develop in the future. He is present. Presence 
is the emergence from the past and the orientation to the 
future. It is where past and future meet. Presence is also the 
emergen.ce from the back and the orientation to the forward. It 
is where the in-there and the out-there meet. His contact with 
culture and with the world comes from his contact with the 
people among whom he is thrown. 
Max Scheler has said that one knows the other before he 
knows himself. 3l Actually there is one triadic relation to self, 
to the other, and to things which makes up human corporal con-
sciousness; none or these relations can be thought apart from the 
others. Yet in a sense Scheler is right. The child is first 
orientated to things in the '!,-forld by living through the percap-
tual and behavi.ora1 patterns of his mother and his other 
teB.chers. Before he has developed his own unique act of expres-
sion, he must live through the expression of another. The child 
is uncoordinated in behaVior and perception. His world has few 
objects. He perceives rew colors but learns to see more as they 
are pointed out to him. More and more objects fill his world as 
they are namrd by a word or gesture. Until he can name them, 
I 
categorize them, and separate them out for himself, he has no 
control over them. He learns the abstract attitude gradually by 
being in contact with that att\tude in his teachers. He puts on 
their schemata, their orient&tion to the world. Gradually, as 
his environment becomes a world for him under the schemata he 
has adopted from his teachers, he becomes conscious of himself 
as a unique act. With thLs conSCiousness, he is able to 50me-
~mat creatively orientate himself to his world. But he is not 
pure freedom. His schemata have been pre-reflectively formed 
by his parents. He has these schemata to work with for good or 
for evil. He must use them to transcend them. This is why Freud 
insists on the impo~tance of infancy in the formation of the 
3lCf• Max Scheler, Mans Place in Nature, translated and 
with an introduction by Hans:Meyernof1; Boston: Beacon Press 
(1961), xviii. 
unconscious (prf;-reflective). A person is given to the objective 
world only by living out ltli th others their gi venness to the 
world; and it is only in his givenness to the world that he is 
given to himself. Co~nunication and the SOCial world are the 
first facts. 
The person lives out another's givenness to the world by 
wearing his behdvioral and perceptual forms. These are the 
sy:llbolic Gestalten by "t,hich the human organism comes to t&rms 
wi th the ~'lOrld.32 M~n can re-work these forms to get a better 
grip on matter. When he is charting out his philosophy or 
selecting the colors and lines of his painting, he is consciollsly 
working his forms. To a large extent these forms are determined 
by past forms and by the matter at hand; so touch so that he teels 
inspired. He wonders whence his \~rds and style and composition 
come. He is an instrument of the Muse. And yet he is an artisan 
laboring over matter. He becomes a master of tools and techniqueso 
He invents new shapes, new words, new colors. By his new word or 
shapp. he points out a reality that has never appeared up to now. 
In a sense he created it; in another sense it forced itself upon 
him. H~ offers it to others. He was offering it to them in the 
very act of creation. 
What do others do \'lhen they hear his ..,;ords or observe his 
painting? Do they pa.ssively wait f("lT these ferms to impress 
themselves on their blank tablets? They do not understand the 
word which has been uttered unless they speak it. The listener 
32Cf• chapter one where man's symbolic behavior was 
butlined 
is not merely coming in contact with words. He is initiated 
into a movement, a spirit, a viewpoint. As the orator sp(:'aks; 
thE; listener speaks the words along l.dth him. He waves his !;l.nns, 
frowns, uses his bcdy ""ith the orator. Both are thinking about 
what is ueing said. But the say5.ng of the "fOrds involves <:1 use 
of th e body of which the orator is im.'T1(~diately mV-3.re. He is 
living out his ~xperience of expressing. The lietener goes 
through the motions of the orator; he subjects hime.elf to his 
style and his way of gesturing. He speaks the Nords the orator 
sl)~aks. In this way men in dialogue are present to each other 
as unique speakl.nt:-acts no matter what th'?y are ta.lking about. 
Likewise the beholder of an art piece cannot Dppr~ci~te it unless 
hG repeats the creati ve process by which it hus co,:ne into lJeing. J3 
In this wayan expressive-act is in union \'!fith an $xpressi va-act, 
not just concrete symbols. An e:dst!~nce communes with an 
existence. In the samE: way that I a'!l bodily present to myself in 
expressing lLyself to the 'NOt'ld, a pr"sence which is called 
li ved or priJlordial 0:1' .Ere-refl(~cti va t I am present to th e other. 
For I live out with him his expressive act. 
The common or obj(~ctive \\'orld evolves "'lthin. a cont.ext of 
!nany individual spf<&ker's. A symbolic ::;ystE:m is developed by 
iuany. And symbolic systems are the mesns by \vhich men are 
orientated to thc::! 'florId. As symbolic system meets symbolic 
system and is unified in the individual, a common world of many 
symbolic world5 is formed. 1fObj ecti "i. tytf i 6 who t is agreed upon 
33cr. Ernest Cassirer, An Essay 2n~' Yale (1944), 
by many. The social world, as background, is unformalized. By 
nature it is prior to the objective \vorld; it is ground •. 
Individuality is not in conflict with the social world, but 
jemands it. Only in communit,y does tho child become a person. 
Only in communication does he become conscious of himtielf as a 
unique speaking-act. He preserves and betters his personality 
by speaking in community, by opening himself to others, by 
"intending" their \\torlds. For this speaking and openness and 
intentionality co~stitutes his very person. 
To return to the question of the chapter: what is the 
ba.sis of communication? What constitutes the unity of the many 
sy:nbolic worlds? What allows an in1i vidual to enter the world 
of another? It is not lantuage-ha'Ving,-been-uttered if this is 
considered by itself in the manner of objective thought. For 
the objective symbolic systems are irreducible to each other. 
The basis sought is the parole. But is not the parole unique? 
Since th ere are no t>~o paroles alike, how can the parole be the 
b?sis of ee·mlllunication'! i1.1hile all speaking-acts are different 
and so incommunicable to a large extent, all are alike in that 
they Ul'e speaking-acts. Merleau-Ponty has uncovered an 
absolut e. All men are alike, for each is an etre-ll-monde. 
In Heidse,ger's terms: the ncategorios'T (datermined b;r our 
language system) are not absoluto, hut the "existentialiat! are. 
If man be man, he is bodily expression to a world. It is to this 
similarity of structure that allows a person to put on the 
cate~ories of a.nother Clnd epeak \on th him his expressi va act. 
This is the common meta-language that grounds the object-languages 
There is a constancy in the objective world in so far as the pre-
objGctive social '<"orid grounds it with its own constancy. 
In the etre-~-monde Marleau-Ponty appears to have reached 
a!'l C1bsolute. It is paradoxically an ambig~uous absolute. For it 
is the evol ving ,~ct of expression. It is the synthesis of the 
subjective and the objective. It originates expressions which 
tend to their own surpassing. Even the philosophic expression 
which names this absolute is subject to re-formulation within a 
whole new system. Nevertheless an absolute is uncovered which 
founds all objective expression. These expressions become 
absolute, not as formulations, but as expressions of the same 
expressive act. Such a discovery seems to lead to a metaphysics 
lilThich posits an absolute Mind to explain the absoluteness of the 
act. But this last idea is alien to the thought of Merleau-Ponty. 
For him philosophy is phenomenology and no more. Since the world 
is basically ambiguous, there is no place for an Absolute Being 
or an Absolute Thought. Does his phenomenology in fact lead 
the philosopher past the phenomenal world into the realm of 
th3 abs,:>lute? Or should one acquiest in the ambiguous? These 
are the questions of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
LJU:GUAGE AND REALITY 
Traditionally philosophy has been defined aa the search 
for ultimate reality or the discovery of the unity in multiplic-
ity, the necessity in contingency, the absolute of the relatiVity 
within which men are immersed. Where thi. absolute, necessity, 
and unity i8 found is the question that divides the philosophers. 
,.. 
Merleau-Ponty offers the world a new absolute: the !1t!-!M-monde 
or corporal intentionality. He uncovers this basic sprior1 
after denying the intellectualist spriori categoriss: Although 
men change in both the speculative and the moral orders, thera i. 
a basis for this change; there is a constant axis of evolution. 
This "absolute" founds a metaphysics and an ethics. However, 
because Kerleau-Ponty is convinced of the fundamental ambiguity 
of life despite this basic fact of existence or because of it, he 
aligns himself to no party that champions an absolute thought or 
an absolute being. Thus he finds himself in the paradoxical 
situation ofrering the world a new and more adequate absolute and 
rejecting it at the same time. For he declared that the basis 
for the community of knowledge could not be found in individual 
formulations but in the speaking-act. But he formulated this. 
Is it to be surpassed by a new formulation? Does not the formu-
lation haye an absolute character in some W8? Sure! the 
philosopher utters a proposition absolutely at a certain time and 
place. What grounds the absoluteness in the act of expression 
and in the formulation itself? Or must the philosopher rid him-
self once and for all of a p~thological concern with the abso-
lute: These questions confront the apprentice of Merleau-Ponty 
atter he has re-created his master's works. He will raise the 
questions in the contf>xt of these works. And he will be in s. 
positio" to go heyot'ld his m&ster--as a good apprenti.ce must--in 
his se,~rch for the truth. Accordingly, Marleau-Ponty's "absolute" 
or apriori which he calls the "n!! c~gito" will be allowed to 
reveal itself side by side with his rejection of the Absolute. 
Perhaps in thi8 way the master mIl be overtaken because he was 
followed. His phenom.enology will be tra.nlcended by the appre!'l.tice 
who engaged himself in it. 
The "New ~o£itoft 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of the "new ,~lli" is 9.n attempt 
to surpass once and for all the Cartesian cog~t~ and the dualistic 
metaphysics implied therein. He begins by criticising the old 
co!ito. 
In the process of radical reflection the philosopher 
finds himself' thinking about the cogito. Sensi.ble objects are 
preSSing upon him. Totally immersed in the objects, conscious-
ness takes flight from itself and is unaware ot itself. This is 
the experience that realiSM tries to account for. The truth of 
Cartesian intellectualism lies in the return of things and 
idp-AS to the self who is always there in union with the things. 
U( 
In tbo self t.here is an experience ot transcendent things. But 
if I experience them as transcendent, then 1 experience them as 
to-be-known and so all not-kno'tAin. The Socratean dilemma io posed: 
Someh\)\~ I mtls1; possess tho things I seek to know; otherwise 1 
would not know what I lfaS ~eeking nor when 1 had stumbled upon 
it. The experience of the existence of an unknown in the selt is 
pos~ib]e only because I already possessed the nature of the 
thing I .p.ncour.t~. Thought, therefore, must be defined as that 
strune;e f,!v-"I':!r of belnf .1head .,f itself; it seeks to know wha t it 
already knows. Thought must have put into things what it conse-
quently finds in them. A sensible perception is not a fact in 
the person vthich he notices. All thought of something is selt-
consciousness. Self-consciousness is the very being ot mind in 
action. It ear.not be brought about by anything whatsoever; it 
is ,~ ~£,u?~ ~l~!. Thinking contains a thought of' itself and of the 
thi.ng it attAins. These thoughts must already be; they are 
anterior to time. Before time one finds a "spiritual act which 
grasps at a distance and impresses into itself everything which 
it ai~st an "1 think' which is by itself and without any adjunct 
an f I B.m,"l Th.i s doctrine leads to the not! on of the timeless-
nees of mind. "Aecordingly, eternity, understood as the power 
tc ~mbrace and antj.cipate tanporal developments in a single 
intention, becomes the very definition of subjectivity. 11 2 
Some strange paradoxes follow this doctrine. If the 
If • .!:., 426. 
2f.E.., 426. 
co£ito reveals a manner of existing that owes nothing to time, 
then there i. no aeaning in the notion of receptivity or mind. 
It can rece! va nothing; for it has everything and constitutes 
everything. If the mind thinks of itself as receiving, it is 
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not really thinking of itself; for it is the mind itself which 
thinks of itselt thus affected. Since it is mind that puts 
itself in time and in the world, it is not there. The selt-
positing is an illusion. Also there could be no other selves. 
"If the sole experience of the subject is the one ~ich I gain by 
coinciding w.ith it, it the mind by definition eludes the outside 
spectator and can be recognized only from within, my cogito i. 
necessarily unique and cannot be 'shared' in by others.") Such a 
consciousness J totally transcendent and uniqtle, cause of i tselt 
and of all other things, eoincides w.1th·God. 
At this pOint Kerleau-Ponty affirms the need "to find a 
middle course between eternity and the atomism of empiricism, 
in order to resume the interpretation of the cogita and ot 
time. n4 For previous analysis has already shown that our rela-
tions with things cannot be eternal ones B.nd tha t our conscious-
ness of self is not the mere recording of psychic events. Before 
objectively thinking aoout perception and the l«.)rld perceived, 
we live our perception and the world. Perception is inseparable 
.3P.P., 427. "5i la seule experience du lujet est celIe 
que j'obtlens en coincida9t avec lui, Ii Itelprtt par definition 
se derobe au "spectateur etranger Tt at ne peut etre reconnu qu' 
interieurement. mon Cogito est par principe unique, il n'est pas 
nparticipable" par un autre." 
4E,.E,., 42e. 
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from the consciousness it has ot reaching the thing itse1t. Any 
contention that the perception is indubitable, whereas the thing 
perceived is not, must be ruled out. It the perceived turns out 
to be an illusion, then it must be admitted that there was no 
true perception. If the perceived is open to doubt, so is the 
perception. This fact torces a choice: either one has no 
certainty regarding things themselves--and this means there ia 
no certainty in regards his perception; or else one grasps his 
thought with certainty; and this involves a simultaneous assump-
tion of the existence of the thing towards which it is projected. 
If Descartes is absolutely certain about the constituting power 
of consciousness, he must at the same time be absolutely sure ot 
the world bEdng constituted. It would be contradictory to assert 
that mind constituted the world and that mind can grasp no more 
than the outline of that world, essences or forms, .s opposed to 
existences. Consciousnes8 is transcendence through and through. 
It is not pa.ssive but acti ve transcendence. The consciousness 
of seeing is no passive recognition of a psychic event having 
taken place, an event which leaves a doubt about the reality of 
the thing seen. Vision is an operation to an object. It i. 
achieved and fulfilled in the thing seen. What is found by the 
cogito is "the deep movement of transcendence which is my very 
being, the simultaneous contact with my own being and wi th the 
being of the world. n5 This means that in the very activity of my 
Sf.t., 432. "Ce que je decouvre et reconnais par Ie 
Cogito, ce ntest pas l'immanence psychologique, ltinherence de 
tous tes phenomenes a des 'itats de conscience prives', Ie 
body in and to the '~orld there is the simultaneous presence ot 
self and world in dialogue. This presence is the new cogito. It 
1s not a second act. It is the act of perception itself in 
union with it self-in-union-\'rl. th -the-world. 
This self-presence does not exclude error or :f.lluslon. 
Experience proves illusion possible on some occasions. But then 
is it not possible on all occasions? If thE) subject is an 
existence, a process which transcends himself, it seems he 1s 
condemned to illusion. By rejocting the absolute consciousness 
ot Descartes. has Marleau-Ponty opted for endless doubt? "This 
objection brings us to the crucial point. It is truf! neither 
that my existence is in full posseSSion of itself, nor that it i. 
entirely estranged from itself because it is an act or a doing, 
and an act by definition is th e violent passing from ,,,-bat I 
have to what I am to have, and from what I am to what I intend to 
be."6 Both scepticism and dogmatism are untenable. I am 
fundamentally an act which has a certain transparency, a certain 
contact wi th my own beir..g and that of the world, in the act ot 
perception itself. But I am not fully transparent nor is m.y 
world complete. The dialot~e between II1yself and my 'tlorld b.sserts 
" contact aveugle de la sensation avec elle-meme~ ••• , c'est 1. 
movement protond de transcendance qui est mon etre meme, Ie 
contact simultane avec mon etra at avec l'~tre du monde." 
6p.P., 438. "L'objection nous fait arriver au point 
essentiel: -11 n'est pas vra1 que mon existence se passede et pas 
dad vantage vrai qu'elle soit etrangere a elle-meme, parce qu'ell. 
est un acte ou un faire, et qutun acte, par definition, est Ie 
passa~e violent de ce que j'ai a xe que je vise, de ce que je 
suis a ee que j'ai l'intention d'etre." 
the reality of both, but the reality of both in transition. My 
act of yesterday is 5urpassed by my act today Which tends to 
its own undoing in my act tomorrow. And yet in each act is a 
commitment and engagement which is the condition of possibility 
of that act. My acts of love, of hate, of doubt itself are 
not mere thoughts about loving, hating, and doubting. In the 
act lies the certainty; it does not lie in the thoughts about 
them. These thoughts are always open to doubt, but the aeting-
about-things is not. To prove the certainty of doubting, one 
has to throw himself in the act. If he tries to verify the 
reality of my doubting, he finds himself in an infinite series. 
For he has to question the thought he has about doubting and the 
thought about that thought. But the certainty derives from 
dOUbt itself as an act, not from the thoughts. Likewise the 
certainty of the world precedes any objective knowledge of 
its properties. To know is to know that one knows. There is 
not a second knowing founding a primary knowing. There is but 
one act testifying to itself. But what it testifies to itself 
here and now, it extends beyond itself into the future. In this 
way I am open to both truth and illusion about myself. "There 
are acts by which I collect myself together in order to surpass 
myself. The cogito is the recognition of this fundamental 
fact."7 In the new cosito the "I alll" and th e "I think" are 
7p.p., 439. "Savoir, c'est bien, comme on l'a dit, 
savoir quTon sait, non que cette seconde puissance du savoir fonde 
Ie savoir lui-meme, mais au contraire parce qu'il 18 fonde. Je 
ne puis reconstruire la chose, at pourtant il y a des choses 
per~ues, de m~me je ne puis jamais coincider avec ma vie que se 
identical. Hot that my existence is brought down to the 
consciousness I have of it, but conversely, the ~I think" is 
re-integrated into the transcending process of the ~I am, ff 
consciousness into existence. 
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Although there is no "selt-coincidence" in acts of love 
and willing, at least in acts of "pure thought" this seems to be 
true. Certainly the mind's assent to mathematical essences is 
set for all time. But, on the contrary, Marleau-Ponty points 
out that the mathematical essence of a triangle, for example, 
is not borrowed from an eternal realm of ideas nor from an 
immutable structure of the intellect. It haa been worked out in 
dialogue with the world ot perception. It is a product of man' a 
creative activity as he comes to terms with the world. 
In aa much aa the body moves itself and is inseparable 
from a View of the world, it is the condition of possibility not 
only of the geometric syntheSis but of all expressive acts and 
all acquired views that constitute the cultural world. 
"Spontaneous thought" does not mean thought that coincides with 
~tself, but thought that surpasses itself. Speech is precisely 
the act by which thought eternalizes itself as truth. Speech 
1s not mere clothing for thought or a translation into arbitrary 
symbols of a meaning already clear to itself. Speech is thought 
completing itself. ThougP it is true that communication 
fuit, et pourtant il y a des perceptions interieures. La meme 
~aison me rend capable d'illusions et de verite a l'egard de 
~oi-meme: c'eat a savoir qutil y a des actes dans lesquels je me 
rassemble pour me depasser. Le Cogito est la reconnaissance de 
pe fait fondamental." 
presupposes a systEm of corre6pondenct~s such as the dictionary 
provides, it goes beyond these. The word takes meaning in a 
sentence in a context. Atter it has been used in various 
contexts the word gradually accumulates a meaning which is 
impossible to establish absolutely. The speaker must be able to 
outrun what he previously thought and to find more in his words 
than he put in them before. For speech is the embodiment of an 
intention which is never terminated but constantly leads beyond 
itself. "Spf'ech is, therefore, that paradoxical operation 
through which, by using words of a given sense and of already 
available meanings, we try to follow upon an intention which 
necessarily surpasses, modifies, and lastly fixes the meanings 
of words which translate it.,,6 In the speaker the utterance 
does not illustrate thought already constituted. Therefore 
thought is always an illusion in so far as it stops a procea. 
that does not stop; it acquires a moment that is already past. 
There are two types of thinking. There is the miserly thinking 
t~at keeps playing with its past acquisitions. It gives the 
impression that thought is eternal and that immutable essences 
are passed down from age to age. Secondly, there is the thinking 
that is struggling to establish itae1f. It aucceedsonly by 
wrenching out of established language some new usage. This 
latter is the fundamental fact. The "idea" 1s always linked 
SP.P., 445-446. "La parole eat done cette operation 
paradoxare-ou noua teJ"ltons de rejoindre, au moyen de mots dont 
"d ' , 1e sena est donne, et e significations deja disponib1es, uno 
# , A inte~tion qui par principe va au dela et modifie, fixe alle-meme 
en derniere analyse Ie sens des lilOts par Iesquels e11e se 
traduit." 
with never ending acts of expression. Therefore it is never 
"pure" or "eternal." In speech thought seems to detach itself 
from its material instruments and acquires an eternal value. It 
seems that triangles will always have angles the sum of two right 
angles even it all men forget geometry. Scientific utterance is 
a cultural entity which claims to translate a truth of brute, 
unchanging nature. But modern criticism has shown the construc-
tive element in scientific concept. "'Real,' that is, perceived, 
triangles do not necessarily have for all eternity angles whose 
SUII equals that of two right angles if it is true that the space 
we live in is no less ~enable to non~Euclidean than to Euclidean , 
, 
geometry."9 Expression is creative arid the expressed is insep-
arable from it. Wo analYSis can make language clear or put it out 
like an object. The act of speaking is clear only for the person 
speaking or co-speaking. We obscure it by talking about it or by 
breaking it down into its components. One cannot conclude from 
this that language born in obscurity yet capable of clarity is 
the embodiment of an infinite thought. "Language transcends us 
and yet we speak. If we are led to conclude from this that there 
exists a transcendent thought which our words spell out, we are 
suppos1ng that an attempt at expression is brought to completion 
atter saying that it can never be so, and invoking an absolute 
thourJl t, WEll we ha ve jus t shown tha t an y su ch thought is beyond 
':" 
our conception_ HlO The phenomenology ot language demonstrates 
that speech is not constituted by some absolute power, it is 
always involved in the temporal. Expression is not substituting 
a system of stable signs for unchangeable thoughts i."t ... ich are 
little by little coming to light. By using words alI'eady used, 
the new intention originates out of the past and is orientated 
to the future. ~Jhat is thought to be non-temporal is a 
symbolization that has carried forward the past and has committed 
itself to the future; it is temporal by nature. "The non-temporal 
is the acquired. Hll 
The analysis of time offers the primary example of the 
"non-telliporal." The present always arises out of the past and 
sowehow includes the pa3t, and at the same time it surpasses the 
past. A Van Gogh painting has its place tor the beholder even 
after he has left it; it has entered into the very formation of 
his personality. If he saw a Van Gogh once, it is always true 
that he saw a Van Gogh once. It X was so once, it is always 
true that I was so once. Each moment of time is eternal, it 
one isolates moments from the flow ot time. Eternity applies to 
the here and now: I is so (here and now) and will always be 
lOp .f.. J 4.49. "14e langage nous transcende et cepengant 
nous parlons. 3i nous concluo~s de Is. qu'il y a une pense. ~ 
trallscendante que nos paroles epellent, nous supposons acheve un 
essai d'expreasion dont nous venons de dire qu'il ne l'est jamais J nous invoquons une pensee absolue au mCI!lent ou noue 
venons de montrer qu'elle est pour noua inconcevable." 
, IIp.f., 450. "Ce quton appelle l'intemporel dc:ns la , 
pensee, cTest ce qui, pour avoir ains! repris Ie passe at engage 
l'avenir, est presomptivement de tous les temps et n'est done 
nullement transeendant au temps. L'inteJ:lporel, c'est l'a.cquis." 
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so (as far as that "here and now") is concerned. But saying this 
moves the speaker to a new here-and-now and a new expression. 
And so the alleged transparency ot Euclidean geometry is one 
day revealed as operative tor a certain moment in the history ot 
the human mind. It is the very same thing to say that the 
present tore shadows eternity as that eternity is the sublimation 
of the present. Our experience of the eternal and absolute is 
in fact the experience of time and process. We are experiencing 
the present making claims to the future, the truth ot today 
tending to the truth ot tomorrow. 
In what lies the so-called self-evidence ot truth then? 
In the utterance ot a proposition the speaker has evidences and 
postulates Which arise out of his very situation in time and 
place. They are present, but unformalized. His proposition has 
a foundation. It is selt-evident in that it rests on silent 
evidences. The formalism is founded by a meta-language. But 
the proposition is not absolutelx self-evident. ror its 
evidences and postulates are not formally justified. One can 
formulate and question them. The,r become the object of a new 
utteranee based upon evidences and postulates arising from a new 
lituation in time and place. Absolute self-evidence would imply 
a formulated truth resting on formally and totally justified 
evidences and on nothing else. It would mean that the act ot 
expression and the expressed were the same thing. There would 
be no background situation within which the act of expression 
arose. Everything would be contained in the expressed. But 
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man is not in such a state of expression; and he is incapable ot 
reaching such a state. To have arrived at a situationless state 
through a process leading from one situation to another is 
impossible. To have become the absolute is contradictory. Since 
my past situation is always with me and is the condition ot 
possibillty of. my movement to the fu.ture, I can never separate 
myself from my past. The past will always provide the unformal-
ized, unquestioned grounds of my present expressions. Therefore, 
self-evident truths are never indubitable. It is ot the essence 
of certainty to be established with reser·vations. I can always 
formalize and question the postulates of these truths; and in 
doing so I rise to a new level of truth. "Once launched and 
committed to a certain order of thoughts, Euclidean space, for 
example. or the conditi.ons governing the existence of a certain 
society, I find evident truths; but these are not unchallengeable 
since perhaps this space and this society are not the only ones 
p05sible.,,12 In sum, Merleau-Ponty is restoring to the cogito 
a "temporal thickness.~l3 The cog;to is never at an absolute 
viewpoint where it is totally transparent to itself. It is 
always a movement in time where even the thought of itself goes 
beyond itself. 
l2f .f ., 454. ~Une £ois entre dans Ie jeu, engage dans un 
certain ordre de pensees, soit par exemple Itespaee euclidien 
ou les conditions dtexistence d~ telle societe, je trouvA des 
evidences, mals ce ne sont pas des evidences sans appel, puisque 
peut-$tre cat espace ou cette societe ne sont pas les 8~uls 
possibles." 
, 13f.f., 456. "En somme nous rendons au Cogito une 
epalsseur temporelle." 
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The illusion of the absolute is due to the fact that in 
expression the expressing fades out before the expressed. 
Expression SUlIS up a situation and a movement C'f thought. But 
the situation and the movement is ignored in favor of the objee-
ti va things attained by that movement. The cO&i to of Descartes 
is something expressed. As expresasd it aequ1.res the character 
of eternity. Descartes ignores the tacit eogito which is the 
act of expression itself. "Behind the spoken cogito, the c,e 
which is converted ipto discourse and into essential truth, there 
lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced by mY8elf.~14 This is 
existence; and though silent and unobjectifi,ed, it must be 
findin~ expression for itself if it is to be. It is not a 
thought of self, a concept t a verbum, an obj act of thinking. It 
is self present to self in its very presence to t!1e wor.ld and 
other selves. It was this silent ~ogito thnt Descartes was 
seeking in his Meditations. But in expressing it he located it 
in the world of the expressed. He objecti!i cd it, eternalized it, 
~nd so destroyed it. This led to the illusion of Absolute 
l4fofo , 462. "Par dela~le cogita parle, celui qui est 
convert! en ~.;monce at en verite d' essence, 11 y a bien un cosito 
tacite, un 'epreuve de moi par moi. Mais cette subjectivite 
tndeclinable n'a sur elle-meme et sur Ie monde qu'une prise 
glissante. Ella ne constitue pas Ie monde, elle Ie devine autour 
~'elle comme un champ qu'elle ne s'est pas donne; elle ne 
constitue pas Ie mot. elle parle comme on chante parcs qu'on est joyeux; elle ne constitue pas Ie sens du mot, il jaJ.l11 t pour 
elle dans son commerce avec le_monde at avec les autres hommes 
~u1 l'habitent, 11 se tr~uve a. l'intersection de plnsiore 
comportements, il est, mema une foi8 tacquist, aussi pricia et 
~ussi peu detinissaple que,le sans dtun geste~ Le Cogito tacite, 
ta presence de soi a 80i, etant l'existence meme, est anterieur 
a toute philosophie •••• " 
Thought. But there is no Absolute Thought. "Absolute Thought is 
no clearer to me than my own finite mind, since it is through 
the latter that I conceive the former. We are in the world; 
that is, things take shape, an immense individual is affirmed. 
Each existence understands itself and understands others. One 
need only to recognize these phenomena Which ground all our 
certainties. The belief in an Absolute Mind or in a world-in-
itself detached from us is but a rationalization of this 
primordial faith."lS 
ftThe New Absolute" 
It is only because the apprentice has entered wholeheart-
edly into the thought of his master that he is able to go 
somewhat beyond him. Merleau-Ponty's apprentice has observed 
his master replace the Cartesian cogito with the "new cogito" 
which is existence or the ambiguous act of man in and to the 
world. He has with his master rejected the rationalist Absolute 
Mind and Thought. But he wishes to find in his master's thought 
grounds for a "new absolute" that will explain the search for the 
absolute which he experiences in himself and which will found an 
ethics and a philosophy of being. To do this he must re-see his 
l5~.f., 46g. "La Pensee absolue n'est pas plus claire pour 
moi que mon esprit fini, puisque c'est par lui que je la pense. 
Nous sommes au monde, c'est-a-dire: des choses se dessinent, un 
immense individu s'affirme, chaque existence se comprend et com-
prend les autres. II n'y a qu'a reconnaitre ces phenomenes qui 
fondent toutes nos cer~itudes. La croyance en un esprit absolu 
ou en unmonde en soi detache de nous n'est qu'une rationalisation 
de cette foi primordiale." 
£A £$=n 
master's evidence tor the rejection of the old absolute. He 
must understand where the absolute is not. 
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The absolute is not in formulations. It is not tn the 
lan~~! or in the earole parlee; it is not objective language, 
though it is precisely this aspect of language which encourages 
the illusion of the absolute. Because the dogmatist uses certain 
words here and now with a determinate meaning that can be located 
in a dictionary, he feels that these words were always the same 
and will always be the same whether there are any speakers on 
earth or not: A "triangle" is always a triangle with certain 
properties. The dogmatist neglects the bodily-act-in-a-situation 
from which the word and meaning originates. Hp. does not see that 
the word acquires a meaning from its use in a number of contexts 
and the meaning is impossible to pin down absolutely.16 Modern 
science finally brings these facts to light. The new science is 
a transposition of the world-view; it is a new way of dealing 
in the world. Newton has given up his chair to Einstein and 
Planck. It is not that the science of Newt,on is wrong. It was 
adequate tor a certain age. It is adequate for this age in so 
tar as it leads to the present developments in science. Without 
. Galileo and Newton there would have been no Einstein and Planck 
to surpass them. Moreover, cultural anthropology ha& 
l6p•po , 445. "II est vrai que la communication presuppose 
UdD systeme ae correspondances tel que celui qui est donne par Ie 
ictionnaire, mais elle va au dela, et clest la phrase qui :~nne son sens a chaque mot, c'est pour avoir eta employe dans 
fferents contextes que Ie mot peu a peu se cha.rge d 'un sens 
~ll 11 n' est pa s possible de fixer absolument." 
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demonstrated the originality of peoples in the formation of 
their diverse moral and speculative systems. It has demonstrated 
the intimate relation of language and world-view and the fact 
that languages differ as organisms differ: each is another 
integration. The common language and the common world is being 
worked out by many peoples in communication. It is not set for 
all times. even though in the here-and-now speaking act it seems 
to be. The objective world is forever developing holistically 
like a huge organism where part is intimately connected with 
part and a change in a part effects a change in the totality. 
Both dogmatism and scepticism must be rejected and synthesized. 
There are no uttered propositions which are set for all times and 
which can be transferred from age to age like marbles of thought. 
Truth is a tots.l system growing organically. On the other hand, 
the utterance partakes in the absolute in that it is proposed 
for the future. The present world-view contains the past, not 
as a bag contains marbles, but as a body contains molecules. 
The utterance is not totally arbitrary or relative. It is 
conditioned by the situation out of which it arises, a situation 
largely formed by past utterances. It is another movement in a 
direction towards a future re-statement. There are no immutable 
essences or meanings or words for they are conditioned by, even 
a8 they condition, their situation. Still they are uttered for 
all times: the modern can to an extent enter into the situation 
or the ancient and utter his proposition with his meaning. Only 
1n this sense can a proposi tion ha ve eternal meaning. So dogma 
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must be continually re-tormulated. Laws must be constantly 
re-written in a whole new system. A philosophy must be re-
discovered and re-stated. The re-statement is not merely saying 
the sawe thing in a new way_It is a whole new saying. 
The analysis of the act of expression demonstrated how 
expression tends to overcome itself. Once an expression is put 
out apart from the speaker, it is a thing in the world and can 
be questioned. The proposition rests on silent~idences which 
can be made new propositions. The process is infinite. In the 
process the common lan~age develops and the boundaries of 
the context of communication are pushed back. Man, the 
speaking-act, is always in the process of becoming more and 
more transparent; but he will never achieve absolute transparency. 
If he did the process would stop. There would be no m.ore 
speaking. There would be no more man. For man is not a wind 
using, but limited by, his body_ He is a living body giving 
meaning and direct.ion to a world. His pre-reflectl.ve body. 
his tacit coSito, will always be the background upon which the 
expressed can appear. Man is thought away when evolution and 
process are thought B.way. But while this affirmation overcomes 
dogmatism, it does not give force to scepticism. For each 
utterance 1s a commitment to the world and to the process of 
giving meaning to the world. Though the statement is question-
able, the act of expressing as it is lived 1s not questionable. 
It is the fact before all facts. Even the act of doubting 
involves a commitment to the thing being doubted and to the act 
of doubtinge It is in the act of expressing !s act that 
scepticism and complete relativity are overcome. There is no 
lived scepticism, as Hume himself so graciously admitted. 17 
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The "new absolute" is the ambiguous act of expression 
itself. The invariabili'ty is not in the "what" man speaks, but 
in the "that I, man speaks; not in the what he knows) but in his 
manner of knowing; not in the verbal cogtto, but in the tacit 
cogito. The invariability is not to be found in the thing itself 
of ths empiricist. Nor is. it found in the mental structures of 
the intellectualist. Neither consciousness nor nature, neither 
mind nor matter, neither structure nor content will suffice. 
The new absolute is in the synthesis of these polarities in 
existenc£.l$ There is no invariable human nature. For a nature 
is a content of thou~t, an expressed; as such as it is always 
subject to change. But man will always be an existence or a 
bodily expression to the world. And thougP thp. act of expression 
l7! • .E., 4)8. "On ne sort de 18 Z'Perpetual doub:!, on ne 
parvient a la fsincerit~' quten prevenant ces SC1~pu~e8 et se 
jeta~t les yeux femes dans Ie 'faire'. Atnpl ce n'est ;?argj! 
Ille J3 pense etre que je Buis cert~n d'exister, mais au contraire 
a certitude que j'a1 des mes pensees derlve de leur existence 
effectiva ••• TJa doute t : 11 n'y a P!~s dtalltre maniere de faire 
cesser tout doute aI' ega.:rd de cette proposi tir>n c;ue de douter 
effect~vement, de s'engager dans l'experience du doute et de 
fa,ire etre ainsi ce doute comma certit'J.di:'} de douter. Doutcr c'sst 
toUjOUIS douter de quelque chose, mema 81 l'on 'doute de tout.'" 
....... 
~ocr. Jean Hyppolite, "Existence et dialectique dans la 
phi~osophie de Merle~.u-Ponty," I.les Te/'l'l:.R~ '''ioc ernes, le4-H!5 (1901), 229. ffCette tension vivante--ra'un mona. sauvage et dtun 
esprit sauvage) est le seu1 savoir absolue de l' existence que 
nous transit antier, puisqu'il n'y a pas d'autre monde auquel 
nous referer •••• " 
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will always be becoming a new act, it will always be an act ot 
expression. The new absolute is found in the very tension and 
evolution of existence.19 
In the nineteenth century, long atter the Copernican 
Revolution physicists were seeking the absolute in space and 
time. They were seeking it in the wrong place. They postulated 
a fixed body or a fixed ether to which everything else moved 
relatively. For they reasoned, space and time are not intelli-
gible if there is no absolute. Yet ether was disproved and no 
fixed bodies could be discovered. Then Einstein made space 
and time intelligible, not by finding an absolute space and 
time J but by prOving the relativity of space-time in his theory 
of relativity expressed by the formula S a./x2 .. y2 .... 2 _ c2t 2• 
Also in the nineteenth century, philosophers were attempting to 
find the absolute in Being. They were seeking it in the wrong 
place. They postulated a fixed nature which impressed the mind 
in a fixed way, or they postulated 'a fixed mind that structured 
matter in a fixed way. But the brute unchanging nature and the 
necessary mind were disproven by the facts of cultural and 
linguistic relativity_ Then Merleau-Ponty made mind and matter 
intelligible by affirming their relativity in his theory of 
19Signes, 228. "L'irrelatif, desormais, ce n'est pas Is 
nature en sol, ni Ie systeme des saisies de Is conscience absolue t 
et pas davantage I 'homme, ma.is cette 'teleologie t dont parle 
Husserl,--qui s'ecrit et se pense entre guillemets,--jointure at 
membrure de l'~tre qui staccomplit a traversl'homme." This 
text and others prove that it is not reading into Merleau-Ponty 
to discover grounds for a"new absolute" in the structure and 
tension of corporal expression. 
existence expressed by the formula lTetre-~-.Qlonde." As Kant 
once proclaimed the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, 
Merleau-Ponty can clai II the philosophic relati vi ty theory. By 
their formulas Einstein and Marleau-Ponty are denying any 
invariability except the invariability l41ich is the formula 
i tsel!. Though all the componen ts of the formula change, the 
formula itself is a constant. Thougp space and time, matter 
and mind are variables, the relations between them are not. It 
is this invariable relation that makes them intelligible. The 
absolute has been found on a new level. 
It must be added that the formula as a formula is subject 
to change. Marleau-Ponty's new absolute is not the formalized, 
but the act of formalizing. But once this has been said, it has 
been formalized and is subject to change. Paradoxically the 
absolute is always being attained and never being attained. It 
is always present. The tacit cogito underlies all expressions. 
But it is never grasped. For this would mean its verbalization; 
and then it would no longer be the tacit cogito. 20 
What does this mean for philosophy? Although Merleau-
~ Panty absolutely affirms the ~-!H-mondet he does not mean that 
with him philosophy has come to a halt. Philosophy as an 
20p•p., 453. "Habemus ideam verum, nous tenons une verite, 
cette epriuve de la verite ne serait savoir absolu que 8i noua 
pouvions en thematiser tous les motifs, c'est-a-dire si nous 
cessons d'etre situes. La possession effective de l'idee vraie 
ne nous,donne donc aucun droit d'affirmer un lieu intelligible 
de pensee adequate et de productivite absolue, elle tonde 
seulement une 1teleologie' de la conscience qui, avec ce premier 
instrument, en forgera de plus parfaits, avec ceux-ci de plus 
parfaits, et ainsi sans fin. 
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expression-expressed is subject to change. Marleau-Ponty's 
absolute affirmation of this new philosophic principle consists 
in offering it to the future. It is still his \iay of !fsinging 
the world. ft His expression is ultimn.tely linked to himself. He 
does not ask his reader to take it whole, aa it is in itself, so 
to speak. His reader must formulate his own philosophy in 
dialogue with Marleau-Ponty. Even so, Merleau-Ponty has attemp-
ted to reach for himself an ftabsolut~," a primordial fact, in the 
.!tt!-,m!-monde, the ba.sic structure of man's involvement in the 
world. Philosophy is a never endtng search to',vork back upon 
the tacit cogito. It is a spealdng nbo'llt speaking. Its subject 
always eludes philosophy because philosophy is a process to 
formalize the unformalizable, of spee . king about what is naturally 
silent. 2l 
Merleau-Ponty ha s said that ma!'l should give up his search 
for the absolute. But he means the old absolute. For be was 
searching for the new absoJ.ut e in the very saying of these words. 
Man will g1 ve up his search for the absolute and for greater 
transparency only by ceaB~n~ to speak. Philosophy is a never-
ending attempt to reach and e constant attainm€~t of the absolute 
view-point. The absolute if' always there exerting lts influence 
as end to be attained. It is the last word. 
Man's basic nature as symb('lli.c act, his sil~nt. cogito, 
is present in every .affirmation as an invariabl e structure '::If 
his involvement in the world. It is this which gives the 
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rfirmation Ii participa.tion in the absolute. Thp. word-having-
een-uttered will chanre. But it rema.ins a moment in the 
speaking process whi ch is a di rection to,,~ards the absolute view-
[-,oint or the l,'lst af.firmp.tion. The "1s" absolutely affirmed in 
he p.xistential propo~i tion "X is T" does not me;;,.L'I'l tha t the 
rOf)ositic.JTl. 1 s nLrnply ~oorl fer aJl times. It is goon for the 
resent which is an orie'!"ltati 01'\ to the fu.ture. Th~ proposition 
dll devplop; nnd S0 will the ;ict. But the act is absolut.e 
,eC~11lS~ it is an intention of the Ahsolute. f·1an is B.lways trying 
A) eet in the last ¥ord. 
Eternity reveale itself in temporality. A proposition 
"i:;Ooo for i1l1 ti mp.e 1f if it 1s EJ momST't in the procAss to the 
a.s!:; proposition. Speaking B. word is absolute if it .furthers the 
.ri v-e to speak the '\ford. Th~ '.mi ty of' man and be! ng cannot be 
rasped if one insists upon cutting into iso1able moments the 
xes of ev()llltion; at e:}.e.~ :Boment he w111 fi nd another n~w 
speaking a.ct and anothAr symbolic ~!T0rld. But speaking .... act and 
·ts world are one vmen grasped as temporality ttself-an infinite 
rocess or spe ~king th e last Word •. 
But if this is an infinito Irr..Q£!1~, :is it true to say 
hat the ultimate Word is never spok~? Can there be an 
ltimeto Word? A man should give up his search for the absolute, 
t couJd b 2 said 'Vn. th ·MerIe~u-Ponty, in tbe sense that a man 
hou1d not hope to arri va ~t the point when he has spoken the 
ast '~ord Ol'l,CE?l and for all. This 'i'I'Ould separate man from. his 
emporali ty and from himself. It is imposs! bl e to become the 
lUts 
absolute speaking act if this means succeeding in having spoken 
the last Word. 22 But it is possible to become the absolute 
speaking act in that man is always in the process of speaking 
the last Word. What is this Word? One does not strictly know 
until he has spoken it. But though man does not know it strictly 
speaking, the Word reveals itself in man's very intention to it. 
It reveals itself aa an ambiguity because the intention is 
ambiguous. It reveals itselt as coming atter man: it is the 
end-product of his process ot speaking that does not end. It 
reveals itself before man irt that it grounds the process and 
gives it meaning: it the Word has not already been spoken, the 
speaking process is directionless, meaningless, and non-existent. 
I~ reveals itself to be the identity of Absolute Speaking-Act 
and the Absolute Spoken-Word. It is complete transparency. 
The Speaking-Word is an ambiguous notion because man 
is essentially caught up in ambiguity. He is a tension in tour 
directions. He is related to the past out of which he emerges 
and to the future to which he is orientated. He intends the 
world and in this way is turned into himselt: the more he gives 
himself to the world in expression, the more he becomes trans-
parent to hiaself and the more he rises from the past to be 
orientated to the future. The Absolute stands behind and in 
the process as Ground giving meaning to the process. The 
22p.p., 431. "Les actes du Je sont d'une telle nature 
qu'ils se-depassent eux-memes et qu'il n'y a pas d'intimite de 18 
conscience. La conscience est de part en part transcendance, non 
pas transcendance subie,--nous avons dit qu'une telle transcen-
dance serait l'arret de 18 conscience,--mais transcendance 
" 
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Absolute stands in front of the process and End being accomplished 
by the process. The Absolute is the meeting-point of Speaker 
and Spoken. It is immanent. Becoming in the very process of 
speaking. It is transcendent Being outside the process, 
23 founding and ending it. 
Can suCh a contradictory notion be affirmed? This is 
similar to the question: can scepticism be refuted? Th. 
answer is "no" if the questioner refers to the words expressed. 
Words can always be questioned and doubted. And so scepticism 
is the answer? But, again, the very act of expressing involves 
a commitment to the world. This commitment is man's given 
situation in the world and his active engagement to the world. 
The absolute as it is lived is indubitable; though, as it is 
formulated, it is deniable. Man can ultimately deny the new 
and true cosito and the new and true absolut e only by ceasing 
to speak and cutting himself off from his world. A philosopher 
may deny the absolute in his 2!role parlee; but in his Rarole 
Earlante he affirms it unceasingly. For he keeps searching; he 
keeps himself open to change and tie reformulation of his 
philosophy. He participates in the communal movement to speak 
the word. The primordial faith involved in this movement may be 
said to lead to the "rationalization of the Absolute." It also 
leads to its realization. For in the act as it is lived, not 
23The Absolute is iDUDanent in that it is the Ground of 
Being; it is the infinite Speaking-Act of which my speaking-act 
is a moment. The Absolute is transcendent in so far as my speak-
ing act is always tending beyond itselt; the Speaking-Act is 
accomplishing itself. Paul Tillich's notion of Transcendental 
Ground of Being can be invoked here. 
as it is expressed, the Absolute is revealed 85 Ground 8~d 
objective. 
.1l.U 
In sum, the Absolute is found in the act of expressing in 
so tar as it is an invariable structure of man's bodily 
involvement in the world. Because philosophy is the expression 
ot this invariability it is constantly changing. It is an act 
ot expression which is constantly 'tending beyond itself. It 
is also a process of self-awareness in which the absolute comea 
more and more to light. The absolute will never be ultimately 
tormulated by man because it is essentially untormulateable: 
it is the tacit eog~. The organic development ot philosophy 
then is towards th e A bsolut e Vie wpoint or th e ultima te Word 
which is the foundation and end of the ts.cit cqgi~2.. The 
Absolute is never tinally reached; the Word is never fully 
spoken by man. But he "knows" it in his intention to it. 
His temporality reveals the eternal. His speaking reveals the 
Word. The progress in thought and the movemen.t to the Absolute 
demands a commitment and a faith which belongs to the philosophic 
speaking Clot. Man must accept and glory in his tension and 
ambiguity. For he will never am ve at the state where he 
finds himself the Absolute Word Speaking Itself. Only this 
primordial faith and acceptance will insure the progress of man 
and his world. 
III 
Phenomenology and MetaphysiCS 
It is clear that Merleau-Ponty has been engaging in 
meta-physics. 24 He has transcended the phenomena by his 
reflection upon them. He has offered the community of 
philosophers a theory of ultimate reality and a unitication of 
all worlds in the basic structure of the ~-~-monde. The 
!1!!.~-monde by its own reflection upon itself transcends itselt 
and discovers the principles of ultimate being. These are not 
two acts or two different levels, one phenomenological, the 
other metaphYSical. The very engagement in phenomenology is a 
transcendence of phenomena. When the philosopher speaks about 
speaking, his act rises above itself as it attempts to get 
hold of itself. 
Philosophy is phenomenology. Phenomenology involves a 
~etaphysics. What does this mean? Language, Marleau-Panty 
protested, is not a collection of verbal responses excited by 
external stimuli; one does not have the sense experience and 
then verbalize it. The use of symbols allows phenomena to 
appear at the same time it structures the phenomena. Philosophy 
uses its higply refined set or symbols to reveal original 
phenomena as well as to form a system. It is both phenomenology 
and metaphysics. By using words Merleau-Ponty was attempting to 
work back upon the pre-reflective bodily act of expression. His 
24We return to a problem posed in the first chapter: 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and philosophical system or the 
relation ot phenomenology to metaphysics. 
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philosophy is a systematic theory of the etre-~-monde •. And it 
is an organic, open system ~ich will not stop gro~ng because 
it will not reach the point where 1t has spoken the last Word. 
Philo8ophy, therefore, 1s the search to speak the last 
Word. It is also the infinite process of speaking the last 
Word. By its own speaking it is working back upon the speaking-
act. At the same time it is forever pushing forward towards 
the ultimate Speaking-Act. This "foreyerness" is frustrating 
for those Who lack a faith in and an acceptance of their own 
process and temporality. They do not rejoice 1n their ambiguity 
nor commit themselves to an ambiguous world; they ~sh to 
release the tension and die .. 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy unifies all speaking acts and 
all symbolic worlds in its account of the invariable structure 
of the speaking act and spoken world as it is lived. His 
thought envelops a plan for an encounter ~th analytic 
philosophy and all philosophies in their concern with language 
and the language-act. The philosopher can claim immortality 
because his philosophy has synthesized tradition and has 
offered itself to the future. It is a moment in the continual 
speaking of the last Word. 
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